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ARTICLES 
CONGRESS AS A CATALYST OF PATENT 
REFORM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
JONAS ANDERSON* 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the dominant 
institution in patent law.  The court’s control over patent law and policy has 
led to a host of academic proposals to shift power away from the court and 
towards other institutions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office, and federal district courts.  Surprisingly, however, 
academics have largely dismissed Congress as a potential institutional check 
on the Federal Circuit.  Congress, it is felt, is too slow, too divided, and too 
beholden to special interests to effectively monitor changes in innovation and 
respond with appropriate reforms. 
This Article takes the opposite position.  It proposes a prominent 
congressional role in patent policy, a role that extends beyond passing reform 
legislation.  Congress’s relationship with the Federal Circuit is a dialogic one 
in which Congress often plays an initial role of catalyst and a final role of 
arbiter.  Understanding Congress’s dialogic role in patent reform is not merely 
a theoretical exercise; this Article traces recent dialogic interactions between 
Congress and the Federal Circuit during the passage of the America Invents 
Act.  The institutional framework proposed by this Article provides a promising 
alternative to continued Federal Circuit expansion over patent policy. 
Furthermore, dialogue between Congress and the Federal Circuit can improve 
decision making at the Federal Circuit while leveraging the relative 
advantages of both institutions in reforming the patent system. 
* Assistant Professor, American University Washington College of Law.  Michael
Burstein, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Paul Gugliuzza, Tim Holbrook, Benjamin Liu, Greg 
Reilly, Jay Thomas, Melissa Wasserman, and participants at the Third Annual 
Patent Conference at Chicago-Kent College of Law provided helpful comments for 
this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A well-functioning patent system is vital to important segments of 
the American economy.1  Notwithstanding the patent system’s 
significance, over the past thirty years supervision of patent policy has 
largely fallen to a single federal appellate court:  the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2  Recently, however, other 
1. Technology companies expend vast amounts of money securing patent
portfolios in order to deter patent infringement suits.  See L. Gordon Crovitz, Google, 
Motorola and the Patent Wars, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news 
/articles/SB10001424053111903639404576518493092643006 (“The value of patents 
in software and hardware such as smartphones has everything to do with litigation 
risk.  It has almost nothing to do with technology.”); see also Google To Acquire Motorola 
Mobility GOOGLE (Aug. 15, 2011), http://investor.google.com/releases/2011/0815.html 
(explaining that Google’s acquisition of Motorola will enable it to exploit the Android 
platform in mobile computing).  When those portfolios fail to deter lawsuits, companies 
often engage in high-stakes litigation that can roil markets.  For example, in August 2012, 
the day after a district court awarded Apple $1.05 billion in its smartphone patent dispute 
with Samsung, Samsung stock dropped 7.5%—a loss of over $12 billion in market 
capitalization.  Miyoung Kim, Samsung Shares Drop $12 Billion After Apple’s Court Victory, 
REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2012, 10:54 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/27/us-
samsung-shares-idUSBRE87Q00120120827. 
2. See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, Evolving the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and Its Patent Law Jurisprudence, 76 MO. L. REV. 629, 630 (2011) (introducing a 
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institutions have increased their interest in patent law.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has recently become extremely active in reviewing 
patent cases.3  Similarly, Congress,4 the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office5 (USPTO), and the Federal Trade Commission6 (FTC) have 
also begun to exert their influence in the area.7 
The Federal Circuit, however, has consistently expanded its 
jurisdiction and authority despite attempts by other institutions to 
influence patent policy.8  Commentators and judges have observed 
the Federal Circuit’s growing influence over patent law and have 
suggested potential avenues for checking the court’s power.9  A rich 
                                                          
symposium and complete law review issue analyzing the Federal Circuit’s thirtieth 
anniversary “as the focal point of patent law policy in the United States”); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit:  Visitation and Custody of Patent 
Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 28 (2007) (utilizing an analogy of 
parental visitation rights to demonstrate that “the Federal Circuit is, for all practical 
purposes, the parent in charge,” while the Supreme Court merely “spends an 
occasional weekend with the kids”).   
 3. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 
IP THEORY 62, 62–63 (2013) (analyzing the reasons behind the Supreme Court’s 
recent “hyperactivity” in patent law”). 
 4. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 
284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (overhauling the patent act). 
 5. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 4 
(2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan_03feb2003 
.pdf (“The USPTO will lead the way in creating a quality-focused, highly productive, 
responsive organization supporting a market-driven intellectual property system for 
the 21st Century.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 6. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www 
.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (outlining independent findings and making 
recommendations based on the patent system and competition policy). 
 7. Although there has been increased interest surrounding the ideal 
distribution of institutional power in the patent system, it remains an 
underdeveloped area of study.  See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing 
Innovation Policy:  A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (“The 
great attention to innovation policy notwithstanding, the issue of which institution(s) 
should be making these decisions is a relatively underexamined area of the law.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359–61 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that Federal Circuit procedural law governs 
cases involving Lanham Act and state trademark claims).  See generally Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1796 
(2013) (elaborating on the Federal Circuit’s attempts to “obstruct[] other institutions 
from shaping patent law”—namely, state courts, other branches of the federal 
government, federal district courts, and the International Trade Commission). 
 9. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”:  A Prescription 
for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 659 (2009) 
(elucidating the perception amongst the Supreme Court and some commentators 
that the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence “has, predictably, gone horribly awry” 
due to its nature as a specialized court); Gugliuzza, supra note 8, at 1834–35 
(describing views of district court judges that the Federal Circuit exercises its power 
arbitrarily, with one district judge comparing patent appeals to “throw[ing] darts” 
(alteration in original)); Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion:  Claim 
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 
(2004) (articulating District Court Judge Patti Saris’s statement that some district 
court judges are “demoralize[d]” by the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate). 
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literature of academic criticism has identified a host of institutions 
that could potentially temper the growth of the court’s power and 
assist the court in setting innovation policy, including (1) the 
Supreme Court,10 (2) district and other circuit courts,11 (3) the 
USPTO,12 and (4) the Solicitor General of the United States.13  
                                                          
 10. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity:  The Federal 
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 806–14 (2008) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, 
Institutional Identity] (analyzing problematic developments between the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Circuit and suggesting solutions, such as the Court using 
amicus briefs as “substitute signals of importance,” since circuit splits on patent issues 
are nonexistent); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the 
Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 795–96 (2010) [hereinafter 
Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn] (analyzing the dialogue between the 
generalist Supreme Court and expert Federal Circuit at both the micro and macro 
levels of patent policy); John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme 
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 284 (noting that the Federal Circuit 
can signal the Supreme Court regarding which cases are ripe for review by drafting 
lengthy en banc decisions with multiple opinions); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 31 
(suggesting that the Supreme Court could have a more prominent impact on 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence if its decisions “resolve[d] discrete issues in ways that 
provide clear guidance for future cases”); Golden, supra note 9, at 662–63 (arguing 
that the Court’s main role in patent law should be to prevent the “undesirable 
ossification of legal doctrine” in the Federal Circuit by providing “partial direction” 
when reviewing substantive patent law); Gary M. Hoffman & Robert L. Kinder, 
Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases:  Placing the Recent Scrutiny in Context 
and Determining if It Will Continue, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 
275–77 (2010) (hinging America’s future economic well-being on the Supreme 
Court’s continued review of the Federal Circuit’s patent decisions in connection with 
creating a strong patent system).  But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court:  A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2–3 (2004) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court in recent years has followed existing Federal 
Circuit precedent, thereby allowing the Federal Circuit to “rewrit[e]” patent law). 
 11. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent Laboratories, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 307, 319–20 (2011) (suggesting limiting the venue for patent cases, which would 
narrow the number of district courts hearing patent case, raise the number brought 
in those districts, and thereby increase the expertise of those judges presiding over 
patent cases); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623–25, 1664–67 (2007) (proposing to allow 
other circuits to hear patent cases, thereby creating “a competitive jurisdictional 
framework” for patent law); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts:  Concentrating Expertise 
on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 889–95 (2002) (proposing specialized patent 
district courts); William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity:  The 
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000) 
(describing the Federal Circuit as “an intermediate appellate court [that] usurps 
elements of the decision-making process” ordinarily left to the trial court and noting 
the negative effects this “judicial hyperactivity” has on district courts); Christopher G. 
Wilson, Note, Embedded Federal Questions, Exclusive Jurisdiction, and Patent-Based 
Malpractice Claims, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1237, 1239–40 (2009) (arguing that 
malpractice suits based on patent litigation should remain in state courts, even 
though the Federal Circuit has statutory jurisdiction). 
 12. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 7, at 6 (urging for the creation of an 
executive branch position to supervise innovation policy); Stuart Minor Benjamin & 
Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What the Patent System Can Learn from 
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 317–20, 326–28 (2007) (advocating for greater 
deference to the USPTO through statutory or judicial implementation of the 
administrative law doctrine); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1747, 1751 (2011) (asserting that Congress should grant the USPTO rule-
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Despite calls for new institutional voices in patent policy, the Federal 
Circuit has, by and large, maintained control of patent law.14 
Surprisingly, scholars have generally dismissed Congress’s potential 
role in supervising patent law and checking the Federal Circuit’s 
expanse.15  There are various reasons for the skepticism with which 
the literature treats congressional action in patent law.  First, 
Congress has shown an extreme disinterest in patent law over the past 
sixty years.16  Since 1952, with the exception of the 2011 Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act17 (AIA), Congress has made only modest 
changes to the patent statute.18  Thus, scholars have tended to ignore 
Congress when discussing institutional relationships in patent 
                                                          
making authority); Gugliuzza, supra note 8, at 1820–26 (suggesting that the USPTO 
is a “weak administrative agency” because “the Federal Circuit enhances its power at 
the expense of the [US]PTO,” and describing various ways that Congress and the 
executive branch have attempted to “push back”); Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an 
Administrative Agency:  The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 754–58 (2011) 
(arguing that the Federal Circuit engages in substantive rulemaking akin to an 
administrative body, and therefore an alternative patent policy authority is needed); 
Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law:  Chevron Deference for the 
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1977–78 (2013) (arguing that courts should afford 
Chevron deference to some USPTO decisions interpreting the Patent Act); see also 
Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 231–33 (2013) (weighing 
the “pros and cons” of the court’s “unorthodox role”; attributing the court’s agency-
like authority to the Patent Act; and arguing that the court is stuck between the 
Supreme Court, which attempts to curb the Federal Circuit’s power, and Congress, 
which seeks uniformity in patent law). 
 13. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 549 (2010) (arguing that the Solicitor General is the de facto 
“competitor” to the Federal Circuit in patent cases at the Supreme Court). 
 14. See generally J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference:  A 
Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard for claim 
construction serves to decrease district court influence); Gugliuzza, supra note 8 
(demonstrating how the Federal Circuit has expanded its influence in various 
institutional relationships). 
 15. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 348 (2005) (claiming that as of 2005, Congress had not 
proposed true “reform” of the patent laws since at least 1836); Arti K. Rai, Engaging 
Facts and Policy:  A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1035, 1041 (2003) (“[T]he history of the patent statute as well as its language 
strongly suggest that Congress has delegated policymaking responsibility in patent 
law to the judiciary.”). 
 16. See Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1965, 1966 (2009) (“Since 1952, Congress has left much of the market for 
supply-side influence in patent law to the federal courts and, to a lesser degree, to 
the [US]PTO.”). 
 17. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 
35 U.S.C.). 
 18. See Long, supra note 16, at 1965–66 (comparing congressional intervention in 
the area of copyright law with more limited intervention into patent statutes); see also 
infra Part II (discussing how the AIA has created a dialogic relationship between 
Congress and the Federal Circuit). 
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policy.19  Second, the few scholars who have considered congressional 
intervention in patent law have dismissed such intervention as 
undesirable.20  Academic critics describe Congress as ill-suited to 
make the frequent, fine-tuned adjustments to patent law that are 
required to have the patent system operate optimally.21  Furthermore, 
Congress is seen as overly beholden to special-interest groups and 
lobbyists interested in capturing patent rents.22 
This Article argues that Congress has a vital role to play in shaping 
patent policy, a role which extends beyond piece-meal modification 
of the patent statute.  As this Article demonstrates, Congress can 
improve the operation of the patent system by acting as a catalyst of 
patent reform at the Federal Circuit.  Congress can nudge the court 
to reconsider calcified precedents or procedural rules that need to be 
updated.  Furthermore, when new technological realities render 
                                                          
 19. See supra note 15 (discussing articles that note Congress’s relative absence of 
activity in the area of patent law). 
 20. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 5 (2009) (suggesting that the judicial branch, and not 
Congress, is best positioned to reform patent law); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and 
the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 108 (2010) (advocating limiting 
Congress’s role in patent reform to “procedural reform and corrective legislative 
action”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 
449, 469–71, 489 (2010) (preferring reform emanating from district courts because 
Congress has been unable to revamp the patent system due to entrenched interest 
groups); William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G. Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving Target:  The 
Development of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report, 91 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 153, 199 (2009) (“Congress should . . . focus its efforts on 
areas clearly outside the purview of the courts, such as improving the operations of 
the USPTO.”). 
A few scholars have noted that Congress has some institutional advantages over the 
courts.  For example, Jay Thomas believes that Congress has better research 
capacities, offers enhanced democratic capabilities, can oversee aspects of USPTO 
management that the Federal Circuit does not review, and can reform the law 
holistically.  See John R. Thomas, Patent Governance in the United States:  Lessons from 
Bilski v. Kappos, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE PATENT LAW:  A COMPARATIVE 
REVIEW OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS 193, 217–18 (Emanuela Arezzo & Gustavo Ghidini 
eds., 2011) (“For these reasons, congressional ability to address recognized concerns 
with the U.S. patent system cannot wisely be discounted or dismissed.”).  Thomas 
views judicial engagement with patent reform as undesirable, see id. at 215 (arguing 
that the congressional decision to await a pending Federal Circuit case “imposed 
months of delay upon congressional efforts, and analysis of its impact seems to have 
cause[d] further deferral of patent reform legislation”), a position with which this 
Article disagrees, see infra Part III. 
 21. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 20, at 5 (proposing that Congress, or any 
other unified body, would be unsuccessful in regulating patent law due to variance 
between industries). 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 6 (hypothesizing that a Congress dependent on industry 
lobbying to form specialized patent rules would create undesirable results); see also 
Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
501, 542 (2010) (arguing that congressional action is preferable only when the 
needed legal change “has high variance (rather than gradual adjustment), low 
specificity (applying to all inventions, independent of context), broad participation 
(including coordination with other policy agendas), and low speed”). 
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aspects of the patent system obsolete, Congress can identify doctrinal 
areas that need reform and signal that need to the Federal Circuit.  
This signaling function is similar to the role that some scholars have 
associated with the Supreme Court in its relationship with the Federal 
Circuit.23  But the signaling function that Congress can undertake is 
potentially much broader than that of the Supreme Court.  Whereas 
the Supreme Court functions as a percolator of change for particular 
doctrines, Congress can suggest broad reform initiatives that can lead 
to substantial overhauls of patent policy at the Federal Circuit. 
When Congress seriously considers legislative reform to the patent 
laws, it opens up a dialogue with the Federal Circuit.  This dialogue 
often begins in Congress and then moves to the Federal Circuit.  The 
court can react to congressional reform proposals in a number of 
ways:  directly lobbying Congress; altering its jurisprudence; or 
increasing supervision and instruction to the USPTO, U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC), and federal district courts.  
Importantly, because the court interacts with the legislative branch, 
the Federal Circuit’s response occurs under the shadow of legislation.  
If the court fails to adequately address the reform issues raised by 
Congress, Congress can choose to amend the patent statute or 
rearrange power structures within the patent system in an effort to 
better align the patent law with innovation policy goals. 
This Article’s reconceptualization of Congress as a catalyst for 
patent reform is not merely theoretical.  Evidence of this dialogic 
relationship with the Federal Circuit recently emerged during the 
patent reform efforts that resulted in the 2011 AIA.24  This Article 
begins by tracing and identifying the dialogic interactions that 
produced that legislation.  During the debate over the AIA, Congress 
initiated the reform effort and established the initial parameters of 
the dialogue with the Federal Circuit.  Congress identified areas of 
patent law in need of reform and proposed legislative changes to 
address those areas.  Among the areas of concern were patent venue, 
monetary damages, and claim construction. 
Congress’s proposed legislation catalyzed the Federal Circuit to 
review its jurisprudence in the areas affected by the legislation.25  
Congress then allowed the court to work out the details of doctrinal 
                                                          
 23. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 9, at 703–05 (identifying the Supreme Court’s 
ability to “percolat[e]” the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence). 
 24. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).  
 25. See generally Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the United States:  Lessons Learned, 
REGULATION, Winter 2012–2013, at 20, 22 (arguing that certain reform proposals 
were “rendered moot by judicial resolution”). 
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change.  The Federal Circuit attempted to resolve the issues 
identified by Congress in a number of different ways.  First, Federal 
Circuit judges publically commented on the merits of the various 
legislative proposals.  Second, the court invoked its discretionary 
mandamus power to alter the patent venue standards.  Third, Federal 
Circuit judges actively advocated for its position to the patent bar, 
urging the bar to appeal damages decisions so that the court could 
shape the jurisprudence surrounding that area of the law.  Lastly, the 
court fundamentally altered long-standing precedents that mooted 
controversial aspects of the pending legislation.  In response to the 
Federal Circuit’s actions, Congress moved forward with an alternate 
legislative agenda. 
What are we to think of Congress’s modern role in patent policy?  
On the one hand, deferring legislative-like decisions to a court runs 
contrary to the traditional view of courts’ and legislatures’ respective 
roles in the political system.  However, Congress certainly envisioned 
that the Federal Circuit would engage in some policymaking 
functions when it established the court in 1982 with a mandate to 
unify and supervise patent law.26  Furthermore, as scholars have noted 
previously, Congress is simply unable to anticipate the policy changes 
necessary to properly reward inventors of cutting-edge technologies.27  
Thus, deferring some policymaking to the Federal Circuit makes 
sense from an institutional standpoint. 
On the other hand, congressional action can have salutary effects 
on the patent system as a whole.  Congress is uniquely suited to 
regulate the balance of power in patent policy.  Along with acting as a 
catalyst for broad reform at the Federal Circuit, Congress can 
regulate the interactions among the various institutions in the patent 
system.  Furthermore, as a representative body, Congress can identify 
and respond to fundamental problems in the patent system more 
swiftly and with more broad-based input than courts. 
                                                          
 26. See Rai, supra note 15, at 1040–41 (deriving the Federal Circuit’s 
policymaking powers from the “open-ended language of the patent statute”).  
Scholars have long recognized that specialized courts—particularly specialized 
appellate courts—are more likely than courts of general jurisdiction to intervene in 
the legislative process.  See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 39–40 
(2011) (describing the tendency of specialized courts to enhance their policymaking 
power); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 254 (rev. 
ed. 1999) (describing the executive and legislative branch’s enhanced control over 
policies set by specialized courts through the power of appointment). 
 27. See supra notes 20–22 (articulating other scholars’ arguments regarding the 
limited instances in which congressional action is desired, such as where policy needs 
to be promulgated quickly, in part because Congress is subject to conflicting special-
interest groups). 
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Somewhat counterintuitively, congressional intervention in patent 
law can actually improve the speed with which patent reform occurs.  
For example, during the debates over the AIA, the Federal Circuit 
altered particularly controversial and troublesome doctrines that the 
court had failed to address for many years prior.28  Those changes to 
thorny doctrinal areas would not likely have occurred absent 
congressional involvement.  Similarly, freed from the quagmire of 
those contentious issues, Congress was able to pursue a reform agenda 
with bipartisan support, an agenda which included altering the 
inventorship standard and improving the funding for the USPTO.29  
Prodding the court to action thus permitted Congress to move forward 
with reforms that had realistic chances of becoming law. 
This Article proceeds in three parts:  Part I provides a historical 
account of congressional involvement in patent law before the AIA.  
Part II traces the dialogic relationship that emerged between 
Congress and the Federal Circuit during the passage of the AIA.  This 
Part focuses on three particularly controversial areas of proposed 
reforms—venue, damages, and claim construction—which were 
ultimately omitted from the final version of the AIA after dialogue 
between the Federal Circuit and Congress.  Part III provides a 
normative assessment of Congress’s new catalytic role in patent law.  
This Part concludes with a critical assessment of the implications that 
Congress’s emerging role has for the future of patent law and policy. 
I. CONGRESS’S ROLE IN PATENT POLICY 
The U.S. Constitution creates distinct powers for the legislative and 
judicial branches.  To Congress, the Constitution grants the power to 
create federal laws.30  To the judiciary, the Constitution grants the 
power to review cases or controversies.31  The separation of powers 
between the branches ensures that distinct governmental bodies 
maintain distinct law-making functions, with each body “in its own 
area, none to operate in the realm assigned to the other.”32 
Despite the distinction between the respective powers granted to 
the legislative and judicial branches, Congress and the courts do 
                                                          
 28. See infra Part II (describing the dialogue between the Federal Circuit and 
Congress that led to the exclusion of three parts of the AIA—namely, the provisions 
on damage awards, venue infringement actions, and interlocutory appeals of claim 
construction rulings). 
 29. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284. 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  That power is limited to some extent by the 
executive branch’s veto power.  See id. 
 31. Id. art. III, § 2. 
 32. Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the “Doctrine” of Separation of Powers, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 592, 593 (1986). 
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engage in a dialogue about the correct interpretation and application 
of laws.33  The “dialogue” between courts and Congress is a rich 
source of study for the legal academy.34  However, because Congress 
has been reluctant to engage with patent law, its dialogic role in 
patent law has been under-theorized.35  This Part builds towards a 
theory of dialogue between Congress and the Federal Circuit by first 
examining the history of Congress’s role in patent policy. 
A. Congress’s Historical Role in Patent Policy 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”36  Congress wasted little time in exercising 
that enumerated power by enacting the nation’s first patent act on 
April 10, 1790.37  The 1790 Patent Act created a patent board to 
determine whether an invention was worthy of a patent.38  The patent 
board consisted of three executive branch officials:  the Secretary of 
State (then Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary of War, and the 
Attorney General.39 
                                                          
 33. As a general matter, the “dialogue” between the courts and Congress occurs 
when the courts interpret and frame issues in need of resolution and Congress 
responds by amending the laws or acquiescing to the judiciary’s interpretation.  See 
Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue?  Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and 
Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 208–09 (2013) (finding that congressional overrides 
of Supreme Court decisions averaged twelve times per congressional session between 
1975 and 1990).  Hasen notes that the frequency of overrides has significantly 
dropped since 1991, and even more since 2001.  Id. at 209. 
 34. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 352 (1991) (describing three scenarios in 
which the statutory interpretation of the Supreme Court is likely to be overridden:  
split decisions based on political ideology, conservative decisions based on plain 
meaning or the canons of construction, and decisions that harm the interests of the 
federal government); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword:  
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority To Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 17–20 (1981) (analyzing the dialogue between the courts 
and Congress over federal court jurisdiction that emerged in the early 1980s as a 
“product of deep hostility” to judicial precedents relating to contentious issues such 
as “abortion rights, school prayers, and public school desegregation through 
mandatory busing”); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word:  
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 425–28 
(1992) (contending that Congress may alter a statute after an unfavorable Supreme 
Court ruling, which, oftentimes, is an interpretation of a constitutional provision). 
 35. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 7, at 2–3 (using the patent system as an 
example to demonstrate the lack of academic discussion concerning which 
governmental institutions should promote and support technological innovation). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 37. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12 (repealed 1793). 
 38. See id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 109–10. 
 39. Id.; accord P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
237, 237–38 (1936). 
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The 1790 Patent Act was short-lived for two reasons.  First, it 
charged the members of the patent board with personally examining 
patents, which, in light of their other responsibilities, proved 
untenable.40  Second, inventors were displeased with the 1790 Patent 
Act’s strict threshold for patent protection—that inventions be 
“sufficiently useful and important.”41  Because of the high standard 
for patentability and the difficulty with members of the President’s 
cabinet personally examining applications, only fifty-seven patents 
were granted during the three years of the 1790 Patent Act.42 
As a result of these failures, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 
1793, which removed the requirement that inventions be “sufficiently 
useful and important” and replaced the examination process with a 
registration system, leaving the evaluation of patentability entirely to 
the courts.43  The Patent Act of 1793 retained a terse standard for 
patentability:  an inventor could patent “any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter, not known or used before the application.”44  
The inventor was still required to provide a written description of the 
invention and the manner of use 
in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from 
all other things before known, and to enable any person skilled in 
the art or science, of which it is a branch, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same.45 
The Patent Act of 1793 placed control of patent policy in the hands 
of the courts.  Congress altered the law only infrequently in the years 
following the act, primarily to expand the class of individuals eligible 
to apply for a patent.46  The task of establishing the contours of 
patent rights and requirements such as infringement and 
                                                          
 40. See § 1, 1 Stat. at 109–10; Federico, supra note 39, at 251; Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Hugh Williamson (Apr. 1, 1792), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 458–59 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., fed. ed. 1904) (lamenting that the patent 
board’s failure to adequately review all patent applications gave him “the most 
poignant mortification”). 
 41. § 1, 1 Stat. at 110; Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 
32 TECH. & CULTURE 932, 935–36 (1991). 
 42. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts:  American Patent 
Law and Administration, 1787–1836 (Part 1), 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 73 
& n.43 (1997). 
 43. See Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 321. 
 44. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 319. 
 45. Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 321. 
 46. Compare Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, §§ 1, 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (permitting 
resident aliens with two years of residency to apply for patent protection and allowing 
treble damages), with Act of July 13, 1832, ch. 203, 4 Stat. 577 (permitting all resident 
aliens with intentions of applying for citizenship to apply for patent protection). 
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patentability concerns fell to the federal courts.47  The doctrines that 
the courts created while interpreting the Patent Act of 1793 remain 
the bedrock of patent law to this day.48 
In response to complaints that patents had become too easy to 
obtain, Congress undertook a major revision of the patent act in 
1836.49  The new act reinstated an executive agency—the patent 
office—to review patents before issuance.50  The 1836 Patent Act, for 
the first time, required the applicant to “particularly specify and point 
out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his 
own invention or discovery.”51  This provision is the antecedent for 
modern claim drafting worldwide.52  Congress also established 
statutory bars,53 created interference proceedings to resolve 
competing claims,54 and provided for patent term extension of seven 
additional years in certain circumstances.55 
Congress revisited the patent statutes periodically during the end 
of the nineteenth century.  Many of the changes during this time 
period were administrative improvements, such as the establishment 
of a three-member panel to review twice-rejected applications56 and a 
provision for the printing of granted patents.57  Congress also 
tinkered with patent length, increasing the standard patent term to 
seventeen years for grant of utility patents58 and optional three-and-a-
half, seven, or fourteen-year terms for design patents.59 
                                                          
 47. See generally Walterscheid, supra note 42, at 64 (“[P]atent acts have always 
depended upon common-law principles for their construction . . . .” (quoting 1 
WILLIAM CALLYHAN ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 15 
n.3 (1890))). 
 48. See Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups 
in the Development of American Patent Law:  1790–1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 
152–53 (2011) (explaining that early cases interpreting patent law developed tests to 
analyze the scope of claims, which have become “the Doctrine of Equivalents”); see 
also Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 490–91, 501–02 (1818) (applying the 1793 
Patent Act to determine the claim scope of an improvement on a multicomponent flour 
milling machine and to determine whether public use prior to the patent application had 
occurred—two issues still addressed in today’s courtrooms). 
 49. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117. 
 50. Id. § 1, 5 Stat. at 117–18. 
 51. Id. § 6, 5 Stat. at 119. 
 52. See generally Anderson & Menell, supra note 14 (describing in detail the rise of 
the claim in patent documents). 
 53. See § 7, 5 Stat. at 119–20.  The statutory bars were (1) prior invention in the 
United States, (2) prior patent or publication anywhere in the world, and (3) public 
use or sale with applicant’s consent.  Id. 
 54. See id. § 8, 5 Stat. at 120–21. 
 55. Id. § 18, 5 Stat. at 124–25. 
 56. Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 3, 12 Stat. 246, 247. 
 57. Id. § 14, 12 Stat. at 249. 
 58. Id. § 16, 12 Stat. at 249. 
 59. Id. § 11, 12 Stat. at 248. 
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As the twentieth century began, the courts and increasingly the 
patent office were left to establish the details of patent policy and 
doctrine.  The Supreme Court established fundamental patent 
principles via doctrinal innovations.  For example, the Court created 
the non-obviousness requirement to eliminate patents on innovations 
that did not exhibit a sufficient degree of inventiveness.60  Courts also 
established completely new doctrines with little relation to the 
statute, such as the rule against double-patenting.61  Further, courts 
limited the ability of applicants to amend applications during 
prosecution before the patent office.62  All of these judicially imposed 
doctrines limited patent-eligibility in vaguely constitutional ways by 
limiting the definition of “discoveries” or invention.63 
This period of relative congressional inaction in patent policy 
ended in 1952.  In enacting the Patent Act of 1952,64 Congress 
statutorily codified two long-standing judicial requirements:  the non-
obviousness and novelty requirements.65  It is important to note that 
Congress did not intervene in patent policy in order to reverse the 
course of the courts and the patent office; rather, Congress stepped 
in to codify long-standing rules and clarify which judicial precedents 
merited statutory codification.66  The landmark Patent Act of 1952 
remains the foundation of patent law today, even though its 
provisions are quite general in nature.67  Since the Patent Act of 1952, 
                                                          
 60. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 263 (1850) (establishing 
the non-obviousness requirement for patent eligibility). 
 61. See Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319 (1865) (establishing the 
double patenting bar, which prohibits patents on obvious inventions filed by the 
same inventor). 
 62. See Godfrey v. Eames, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 317, 324–25 (1863) (holding that 
amendments to a specification could not introduce “a distinct and different 
invention” that had not been “contemplated by the specification[] as submitted at 
the outset”). 
 63. See, e.g., Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 269–70 (establishing an inventiveness 
threshold via the obviousness requirement). 
 64. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 65. See id. § 102, 66 Stat. at 797–98 (novelty); id. § 103, 66 Stat. at 798 (non-obvious). 
 66. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 5 (1952) (“[T]he principal purpose of the bill is 
the codification of title 35, United States Code and involves simplification and 
clarification of language and arrangement, and elimination of obsolete and 
redundant provisions . . . .  The major changes or innovations in the title consist of 
incorporating a requirement for invention in § 103 and the judicial doctrine of 
contributory infringement in § 271.”); see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United 
States Patent Act in the Light of Comparative Law I, 102 U. PENN. L. REV. 291, 291 (1954) 
(noting that the 1952 Act was an exercise in “revision and recodification”); Giles S. 
Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 476, 
480–97 (1953) (describing how section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952 codified the 
doctrines of clean hands and of contributory infringement). 
 67. See Long, supra note 16, at 1969 (“The broad standards that comprise most of the 
patent code indicate that Congress has delegated patent policy to the courts . . . .”). 
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Congress has been largely silent on patent matters, deferring more 
and more to the judicial and executive branches.68  When Congress 
has intervened, it has generally done so: (1) to change technical 
requirements of a patent application,69 (2) to protect particular 
interest groups or patent categories,70 (3) to implement treaty 
requirements,71 or (4) to modify the administrative structure of the 
patent system.72 
Indeed, Congress’s deferral to the other branches in setting patent 
policy led to the creation of an entirely new federal court of appeals 
to handle patent cases:  the Federal Circuit.73  The unique role of the 
Federal Circuit in the U.S. legal system allows the court to straddle 
the boundary between legislator and tribunal. 
B. The Creation of the Federal Circuit 
The federal judiciary is, to a large extent, comprised of generalist 
judges and generalist courts.74  Before the creation of the Federal 
Circuit, all twelve extant Article III appeals courts were courts of 
general jurisdiction.75  However, in 1982, Congress began an 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 1968 (“On the few occasions that significant amendments to the patent 
statute have been successful, they have often pertained to procedural or 
administrative matters—such as better funding for the [US]PTO—on which all 
participants agree.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 6(a), 96 Stat. 317, 320 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2012)) (liberalizing the remedies for 
incorrect listing of inventors on an application). 
 70. See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598–99 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156) (extending patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions). 
 71. See, e.g., Act To Authorize the United States To Participate in Chapter II of 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Pub. L. No. 99-616, § 4, 100 Stat. 3485, 3485–86 
(1986) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 362) (granting the USPTO the authority 
to carry out searches of international applications). 
 72. See, e.g., Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, tit. II, 98 Stat 
3383, 3386–89 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (consolidating 
USPTO review bodies into the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences). 
 73. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(establishing the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims).  The Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a). 
 74. See BAUM, supra note 26, at 1–2 (noting that while the legislative and 
executive branches are bastions of specialization, the judiciary prides itself on 
“specializ[ing] in judging but not in any particular subject matter”). 
 75. The U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) is another Article III court 
that has jurisdiction based on subject matter rather than geography.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(a)–(c).  The CIT is a trial level tribunal with appeals being heard at the 
Federal Circuit.  Id. § 1295(a)(5)–(6).  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit is considered by some to be a specialized court.  See, e.g., John M. Golden, The 
Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit:  Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 554 (2010) (characterizing the D.C. Circuit as a “quasi-
specialized administrative law court” (quoting CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL 
POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT, at xiii (1999))).  While the D.C. Circuit does 
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“experiment” in specialized appellate adjudication.76  The Federal 
Circuit was created by combining two Article I courts:  the U.S. Court 
of Claims and the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.77  
Congress granted the court exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals 
arising under the patent laws, whether originating from U.S. district 
courts,78 the USPTO,79 or the ITC.80  Thus, the court has enjoyed a 
near monopoly on patent appeals for over thirty years.81 
Advocates proffered various rationales for the need to create a 
specialized patent appellate court.  First, proponents argued that 
concentrating patent appeals in a single court would create stability 
and predictability in the law.82  The creation of the Federal Circuit, it 
was argued, would result in a single, uniform body of law and 
eliminate the widespread practice of patent forum shopping that 
existed in the 1970s.83  It was hoped that uniformity and predictability 
                                                          
have some specialized jurisdiction relating to review of administrative agencies, the 
bulk of its caseload stems from geographic-based appeals.  See id. at 554–55. 
 76. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit] 
(referring to the creation of the Federal Circuit as “a sustained experiment in 
specialization”). 
 77. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT:  A HISTORY, 
1982–1990, at 1 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991) (describing the court’s origins); see 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
 78. See § 127(a), 96 Stat. at 37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)) 
(granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases in which the 
district court’s jurisdiction arises under the Patent Act). 
 79. Id. § 127(a), 96 Stat. at 38 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(4)(A)).  
 80. Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6)). 
 81. The only area of patent law over which the Federal Circuit does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction is in relation to patent questions that are raised exclusively in 
non-compulsory counterclaims.  See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832 (2002) (“[W]e decline to transform the longstanding 
well-pleaded-complaint rule into the ‘well-pleaded-complaint-or-counterclaim rule’ 
urged by respondent.”); Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., 728 F.3d 1374, 1378–81 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (discussing the AIA partially undermining the Holmes rule and expanding 
Federal Circuit jurisdiction to cover patent issues raised in compulsory counter-
claims); see also Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:  
Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 539–41 (2012) [hereinafter Matal, AIA Guide Part II] 
(identifying the “Holmes Group fix,” added by the Senate in 2011, which abrogated 
Holmes, 535 U.S. 826, and granted federal jurisdiction only to compulsory 
counterclaims (footnote omitted)). 
 82. See COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND 
INTERNAL PROCEDURES:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 
369–71 (1975) (advocating for a single court with nationally binding jurisdiction 
to guide and monitor the field of patent law in order to end the geographical 
circuit deviations). 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 370–71 (“Patentees now scramble to get into the 5th, 6th and 
7th circuits since the courts there are not inhospitable to patents whereas infringers 
scramble to get anywhere but in these circuits.  Such forum shopping not only 
increases litigation costs inordinately and decreases one’s ability to advise clients, it 
demeans the entire judicial process and the patent system as well.”); Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit, supra note 76, at 7 (maintaining that one of the purposes of the 
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in the law would encourage increased investment in patent-eligible 
technologies.84  Second, proponents argued that the expertise gained 
by judges on the new court would allow the court to efficiently 
adjudicate patent cases.85  Specialization requires judges to repeatedly 
hear a particular type of case; repetition, in turn, allows judges to 
quickly dispose of their work.86  Specialization also frees generalist 
courts from having to occasionally wade into complicated areas with 
which they have little experience, such as patent law.87  Clearing 
dockets of unwanted patent cases, it was thought, would allow 
generalist judges to more quickly dispose of their remaining 
caseload.88  Lastly, proponents believed that concentrating patent 
cases in one court would lead to increased judicial expertise and thus 
higher-quality decisions.89 
The creation of the Federal Circuit was not without criticism.  
Opponents of the court argued that specialized courts suffered from 
“tunnel vision.”90  By hearing only a limited subset of legal issues, 
specialist judges may become convinced of the subset’s importance 
and create jurisprudence with an eye towards further increasing the 
subset’s importance and thereby enhancing the influence of the 
                                                          
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 was to resolve forum shopping issues by 
providing a single forum for patent arguments). 
 84. See Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 76, at 2–3, 7 (describing the 
difficulties of multiple forums hearing patent disputes and the measures taken to 
remedy these difficulties); see also Duffy, supra note 13, at 518 (“[T]he court was 
expected to create a unified body of patent precedents that would be developed by 
judges having some substantial degree of experience and expertise in the field.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit–1981:  Hearings on H.R. 2405 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 42–43 (1981) (statement of the Hon. Howard T. Markey, C.J., 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) (analogizing judicial specialization to “brain 
surgery” and arguing that specialized courts will be more efficient, just as specialized 
surgeons perform brain surgery much more quickly than general surgeons). 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. at 43. 
 88. See id. at 42–43. 
 89. See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 26, at 33 (“The most useful way to define [quality] 
is in relation to what judges are trying accomplish.  If judges seek to interpret the law 
well, expertise helps them choose the best interpretation.  If they seek to make good 
policy, expertise helps them identify the case outcomes and legal doctrines that 
constitute good policy as they define it.”); cf. David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, 
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action:  Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 67–68 (1975) (articulating arguments for the creation of specialized 
administrative courts, such as “the notion that review of highly technical 
administrative decisions requires a better grasp of the subject matter than can be 
expected from the generalist judge”).  But see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized 
Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 379–82 (expounding the negative impacts that 
specialized courts create, such as “an isolation that jeopardizes [a specialized court’s] 
ability to shape the law”).  See generally Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in 
Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330–32 (1991) (comparing and contrasting 
“[t]he general benefits and costs of specialized courts”). 
 90. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 76, at 3. 
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court.91  Additionally, opponents of the court’s creation expressed 
concern that the court would be prone to “capture,” in that repeat 
litigants before the court would gain influence and sway over the 
court’s decisions.  Concentrating a particular type of case in a single 
court increases the incentives for affected parties to influence the 
decisions of that court as well as future appointments of judges.92  
Lastly, some critics suggested that the repetitive caseload of the 
Federal Circuit would fail to attract “talented jurists.”93 
C. Control of Patent Policy 
Despite these criticisms, Congress’s decision to create the Federal 
Circuit has been, from most perspectives, a “success.”94  Industry 
groups are largely satisfied with the court, other countries have 
begun imitating the U.S. patent institutional structures,95 and 
generalized appellate courts have rarely complained about the 
absence of patent cases on their dockets.96  As hoped, the court’s 
virtual monopoly over patent appeals has eliminated patent forum 
shopping, at least at the appellate level.97  The court has also 
implemented a number of procedural and case management 
innovations that have improved the predictability of patent 
                                                          
 91. See Gugliuzza, supra note 8, at 1853–54 (describing how the Federal 
Circuit has leveraged its specialized status by creating legal rules that expand the 
court’s jurisdiction). 
 92. See Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 76, at 3 (articulating the criticism 
that specialized judges “are susceptible to ‘capture’ by the bar that regularly practices 
before them” (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 157 (1985))). 
 93. Id. (explaining that the narrowness of the work and the lack of originality in 
opinions may deter talented jurists from the specialized patent field (citing POSNER, 
supra note 92, at 150))). 
 94. See Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn, supra note 10, at 790 
(chronicling the development of the Federal Circuit and noting that concerns 
regarding the specialization of the court did not materialize). 
 95. Id.  See generally Peter J. Corcoran, III, Strategies To Save Resources and Reduce E-
Discovery Costs in Patent Litigation, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103 (2013) (analyzing the 
court’s model order on e-discovery that applied an innovated use of predictive 
coding, helping streamline document review in patent litigation at the Federal 
Circuit and in some district courts with large patent dockets). 
 96. During hearings on the formation of the Federal Circuit, Congressman 
Sawyer suggested that presiding over patent cases was one of “the most unattractive 
thing about being a federal judge.”  Hearings, supra note 85, at 46 (statement of Rep. 
Harold S. Sawyer). 
 97. Forum shopping at the district court level, however, is widespread.  See, e.g., J. 
Jonas Anderson, Litigant Shopping:  Federal Courts and the Competition for Patent Cases, 
163 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) 
(arguing that some district courts engage in “litigant shopping”); Kimberly A. Moore, 
Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:  Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 889, 892 (2001) (finding that a lack of uniformity among districts hearing 
patent cases led to widespread forum shopping). 
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enforceability and standardized various aspects of patent litigation.98  
Most importantly, some observers credit the court with making 
substantive alterations to patent jurisprudence that have resulted in 
increased predictability across the most critical aspects of patent 
enforcement including infringement, validity,99 and licensing.100 
But not everyone is satisfied.  Although the Federal Circuit is 
generally credited with strengthening patent rights, it has been less 
successful in establishing a clear national patent policy.101  The court 
has been criticized as overly formalistic and tone deaf to the 
implications of its decisions on larger national policies.102  Indeed, 
the court has explicitly disavowed any role in crafting patent policy.103 
                                                          
 98. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 391 
(1996) (affirming the Federal Circuit’s ruling that claim construction is reserved for 
the courts).  The Markman case has resulted in the widespread adoption of Markman 
hearings in which, usually prior to trial, the trial court construes the meaning of the 
patent claim terms.  Frank M. Gasparo, Note, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
and Its Procedural Shock Wave:  The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & Pol’y 723, 723–26 
(1997).  The Federal Circuit has received significant criticism for its claim 
construction jurisprudence and the corresponding high reversal rate of claim 
construction appeals.  See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later:  Is 
Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 232–34 (2005) 
(reporting a 34.5% reversal rate from 1996 to 2003 and indicating that “existing 
literature asserts a reversal rate ranging from 25% to 50%, depending on the study 
cited”).  Nevertheless, other scholars have noted that this rate is not substantially 
higher than reversal rates in other complex fields.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim 
Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1033, 1038–39 (2007) (noting that the patent claim construction reversal rate is not 
substantially higher than reversal rates observed in the political science literature).  
Peter Menell and I have demonstrated that the rate of claim construction reversals 
has recently dropped.  See, e.g., Anderson & Menell, supra note 14, at 40 tbl.3 (finding 
a 20.4% reversal rate of claim construction in 2011 and a significant drop in reversal 
rates since 2005). 
 99. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt:  Dissent, Indeterminacy, and 
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1072 (2007) (arguing that 
the Federal Circuit has increased predictability in the infringement and 
validity contexts). 
 100. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law 
Jurisprudence:  Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 202 (2009) (describing 
the Federal Circuit’s lead role in evolving the common law of licensing, which has 
led other courts to look to it for guidance). 
 101. See Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 10, at 827 (finding that the 
Federal Circuit has not succeeded “in using its expertise to keep patent law 
responsive to changing technological facts and emerging national interests”). 
 102. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 
773–75 (2003) (“asserting that the Federal Circuit has embraced an increasingly 
formal jurisprudence,” asking only “whether the invention is minimally useful,” 
rather than weighing its effect on innovation policy—an inclination that causes the 
court to “drift toward simple rules”). 
 103. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
689 F.3d 1303, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[D]isapproving of patents on medical 
methods and novel biological molecules are policy questions best left to 
Congress . . . .”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).  Federal Circuit judges have taken this 
stance off the bench as well.  See, e.g., Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations:  Guiding 
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Despite the Federal Circuit’s explicit disavowal of patent 
policymaking, the court has fiercely defended its primacy over patent 
law.104  Because of the sparseness of the patent statute, policymaking 
is an implicit reality of patent adjudication in the United States.105  
Thus, the court has had to doctrinally innovate to achieve current 
levels of uniformity and predictability, a task that involves policy-
based selections of preferential doctrines.106 
Some commentators have suggested that the court can and should 
do more.  Professor John Golden, for example, has encouraged the 
Federal Circuit to act as a doctrinal “percolator.”107  He has argued 
that by avoiding overbroad readings of its own panel opinions and 
reviewing important doctrines as an en banc court, the Federal 
Circuit can “ensure that its interpretations and applications of 
Congress’s statutory scheme remain sensible in light of new 
circumstances and knowledge.”108 
                                                          
Principles as Navigational Aids, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 764–65 (2004) (dismissing 
the need for the court to engage in a “discussion of philosophy”); S. Jay Plager & 
Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle:  A Response to Nard and 
Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735, 1737, 1749 (2007) (proclaiming that “the court’s 
function is not to assess the extent to which the congressional policy is responsive to 
current problems or to determine how well-tuned the statute is to subtle changes in 
people’s behavior or market conditions,” but acknowledging that court must engage 
in doctrinal “testing and rethinking,” even when a consensus has been reached); 
Judge Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court, Address at the Fifth Annual Seton Hall 
Law and New Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association Fall Lecture Series (Oct. 
23, 2007) (prepared remarks available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories 
/announcements/2008/AL_Williamsburg_Speech.pdf) (“Since I have been on the 
court, over 18 years, not once have we had a discussion as to what direction the law 
should take . . . .  That is because we are not a policy-making body.  We have just applied 
precedent as best we could determine it to the cases that have come before us.”). 
 104. See Gugliuzza, supra note 8, at 1828–30 (summarizing the means by which the 
Federal Circuit has asserted its power over forming patent law by adjudicating state 
court claims arising alongside patent cases, developing rules that respond to pending 
patent proposals before Congress, and limiting the authority of the USPTO). 
 105. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1674 (2003) (explaining because Congress intentionally created “a statute that 
contains more standards than rules,” the court, “[e]ven if it wanted to, . . . could not 
eliminate the resulting discretion without fundamentally rewriting the rules of patent 
law”); see also Vacca, supra note 12, at 758 (arguing that the Federal Circuit is “the 
only institution that could handle the task” of setting federal patent policy); Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1440 & n.7 (2012) 
(stating that the Federal Circuit judge’s “boasting [in their disinterest in patent 
policy] misses the point”). 
 106. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71, 983–84 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (establishing the uniform rule that claim construction is a 
matter of law to be exclusively determined by a judge to avoid the complexities 
created by potential Seventh Amendment conflicts and factual inquiries), aff’d, 517 
U.S. 370 (1996). 
 107. See Golden, supra note 9, at 716–20 (advocating changes the Federal Circuit 
can make to take on the role of the “second percolator,” with the Supreme Court 
being the first). 
 108. Id. 
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Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss views the Federal Circuit’s 
achievement of increased predictability as a preliminary step in 
achieving a much larger goal:  transforming the Federal Circuit into 
an overt policymaking body.109  As she has said: 
Now that [the Federal Circuit’s] credibility is solidified, it can be 
more proactive about developing procedural law that makes good 
use of its expertise.  It can also shift its focus from meeting 
Congress’s short-term uniformity and predictability objectives to 
assuming its role as the near-final authority in patent 
jurisprudence, responsible for crafting law that is responsive to the 
needs of the creative community and the users of knowledge 
products.110 
Professor Dreyfuss has encouraged the Supreme Court to clarify 
whether the Federal Circuit is “just one more appellate court” or 
whether the court has a special role to play in shaping patent law.111 
These scholars and others have devoted substantial attention to the 
Federal Circuit experiment and the role that the court plays in 
setting patent policy.  Several researchers have studied the court’s 
relationship with the USPTO, the district courts, and the Supreme 
Court.112  However, little attention has been paid to the court’s 
relationship with the institution most directly responsible for setting 
patent policy:  Congress.113  This surprising gap in the scholarship is 
likely due to the clearly defined roles that each institution plays:  
Congress crafts legislation, after which the Federal Circuit must apply 
                                                          
 109. Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 10, at 827–28 (expressing hope that 
the court’s doctrinal and policy problems will be cured by “[t]he next generation of 
jurists” and advocating that practitioners “consider more policy-oriented briefing” as 
the court evolves).  See generally David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent 
Law Adjudication:  Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415 (2013) (analyzing 
Dreyfuss’s and other scholar’s positions and advancing the argument that the 
Supreme Court must police the Federal Circuit’s consideration of rule-based 
adjudication in order to increase uniformity). 
 110. Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 10, at 827. 
 111. Id. at 828. 
 112. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text (listing scholars’ arguments for 
ebbing the Federal Circuit’s control over patents through increased involvement of 
other institutions and courts). 
 113. The treatment of the court’s relationship with Congress tends to be cursory 
or tangential.  For instance, in an excellent treatment of the court’s policymaking 
capacity vis-à-vis the USPTO, Ryan Vacca devoted one paragraph to Congress’s role 
in patent policy.  See Vacca, supra note 12, at 752–53 (“In sum, although Congress has 
recently passed patent reform after several years of being unable to muster the 
political will to do so, much work remains to be done.”).  In his 2013 article, Paul 
Gugliuzza provided examples of the court’s “indirect dialogue” with Congress.  See 
Gugliuzza, supra note 8, at 1827–28 (indicating that in 2008, while proposals to 
amend federal venue provisions in patent cases were pending in Congress, “the 
Federal Circuit—for the first time ever—ordered a district court to transfer a patent 
case to a more convenient forum”). 
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and interpret Congress’s directives.114  Alternatively, the lack of 
attention may stem from Congress’s apparent disinterest in patent 
law from 1952 to 2005.115  The following Part begins to address the 
role that Congress plays in modern patent reform by closely tracing 
the dialogic relationship that has recently emerged between Congress 
and the Federal Circuit. 
II. CATALYZING PATENT REFORM:  LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL 
DIALOGUE DURING PASSAGE OF THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 
(2005–2011) 
On September 16, 2011, after six years of legislative debate, 
President Obama signed the AIA into law.116  The final bill 
represented the most comprehensive legislative reform of U.S. patent 
law in nearly sixty years.117  The enacted law made two major changes 
to the patent system.  First, it changed the U.S. system from a first-to-
invent system to a first-to-file system—similar, but not identical, to the 
system used in nearly every other country.118  Second, the law created a 
number of post-grant review procedures at the USPTO with the intended 
result of increased administrative oversight of the patent system.119 
While the AIA represents a significant departure from the previous 
statutory regime, earlier versions of the bill contained much more 
                                                          
 114. See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:  
Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 438–47 (2012) [hereinafter Matal, AIA Guide Part I] 
(outlining the path to enacting the AIA from the first draft submitted by Representative 
Lamar Smith in 2005, to its eventual signing in 2011 by President Obama). 
 115. See supra notes 16–18 (explaining that until the AIA, Congress made only 
small changes to the patent statute after 1952). 
 116. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Matal, AIA Guide Part II, supra note 81, 
at 651 (“After six years of efforts on patent reform, the sponsors and supporters of 
the AIA understandably were eager to send it directly to the President for his 
signature.”); see also President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent 
System To Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps To Help Entrepreneurs 
Create Jobs, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-
stim (quoting the President as stating he was “pleased to sign” the “much-needed reform”). 
 117. See Matal, AIA Guide Part II, supra note 114, at 435 (explaining that “[t]he AIA 
is the first comprehensive patent bill to be enacted since the Patent Act of 1952”). 
 118. See § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–87 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)) (creating 
a first-to-file system, meaning that the critical date in determining whether a patent 
application meets the substantive requirements to be valid as a novel invention or 
improvement is defined by the date the application was filed, whereas the U.S. 
previously determined the critical date by the patent’s invention date); see also 
Matal, AIA Guide Part I, supra note 114, at 453–66 (discussing the legislative history 
of this provision). 
 119. See, e.g., § 6, 125 Stat. at 299, 306 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2012)) 
(providing for inter partes and post-grant review).  See generally Matal, AIA Guide Part 
II, supra note 81 (describing the evolution and eventual adoption of the AIA post-
issuance proceedings including inter partes review and post-grant review). 
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radical changes.120  Of course, the fact that a proposed law is modified 
during the legislative process does not, standing alone, merit serious 
attention.  However, the manner in which Congress and the Federal 
Circuit engaged with each other during the patent reform process is 
noteworthy.  This Part traces the legislative proposals that led to the 
AIA as well as the Federal Circuit’s corresponding reaction to those 
proposals.  It focuses on three controversial proposals in early 
versions of patent reform legislation—venue, damages, and claim 
construction—that were all excised from the enacted bill. 
A. The Beginning of Patent Reform:  109th Congress (2005–2006) 
The protracted legislative battle over patent reform involved 
diverse parties with vested interests in the patent system.121  High-
technology companies had become largely disillusioned with the 
patent system.122  Because of the cumulative nature of innovation in 
the industry, technology companies inevitably encountered patent 
barriers in commercializing their products.123  Notable instances of 
large damage awards or injunctions on popular consumer electronics 
soured many in the industry on the patent system.124  Furthermore, 
the rise of the so-called “patent troll” exposed companies to high 
settlement costs for inadvertently infringing on relatively minor 
                                                          
 120. See Matal, AIA Guide Part I, supra note 114, at 438–47 (describing the history 
of the bill from introduction in 2005 through enactment including the Leahy and 
Berman bills that had several controversial provisions).  Compare, e.g., America 
Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 5 (as introduced in House, Mar. 30, 2011) 
(proposing an infringement defense “based on earlier inventor”), with § 5, 125 Stat. 
at 297 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273) (enacting a “[d]efense to infringement based on 
prior commercial use”). 
 121. See Nguyen, supra note 20, at 468–71 (discussing the unsuccessful attempts to 
enact patent reform legislation from 2005 to 2010 and attributing the Congress’s 
failures to “the opposing interests of the various industry sectors regarding patents 
and innovation”); see, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology’s Prescription for 
Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 318, 323–25 (2006) (describing 
the biotechnology industry’s interest in patent reform and how those interests often 
clashed with the technology industry). 
 122. For a more detailed discussion, see Burk & Lemley, supra note 105, at 1630–
38 (discussing the pros and cons of industry-specific patent legislation). 
 123. See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and 
One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007) (noting that there are often hundreds if 
not thousands of patents covering every product in the IT industry). 
 124. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (noting $53,704,322.69 damages awarded by the lower court to NTP for 
Research in Motion’s BlackBerryTM system infringement of several of NTP’s patents); 
Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. No. 00-20905, 2006 WL 1991760, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting a jury award of $306,967,272 for sales of a product 
containing a Rambus SDRAM device); see also Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee 
Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263, 265 (2007) 
(discussing the excessive overcompensation available through the entire market 
value rule when calculating damages of multicomponent electronic devices). 
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inventions.125  Technology companies often found themselves at the 
defendant’s table in patent litigation and were thus interested in 
capping damage awards, limiting venue options for patent holders, 
and reducing litigation costs.126 
In contrast to the high tech industries, the pharmaceutical and 
biotech industries depend upon the strength of the patent system in 
order to recoup the high cost of research and development of new 
drugs.127  When research and development is successful, pharmaceutical 
companies require legal means to fend off copyists.128  Because there is 
little likelihood of innocent infringement in the industry, patent trolls 
do not pose a threat.129 
Thus, the pharma and biotech industries were interested in patent 
reform measures that differed from the measures preferred by the 
software and electronics industries.  Pharmaceutical companies 
favored strong patent rights and the ability to collect large damage 
awards.  The pharmaceutical industry was concerned with 
congressional proposals to cap damage amounts and therefore 
lobbied against patent reform.130  Small inventors and research 
institutions joined the lobbying efforts of the pharmaceutical 
                                                          
 125. See Gene Sterling, Taking on Patent Trolls To Protect American Innovation, WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04 
/taking-patent-trolls-protect-american-innovation (detailing the rise of “patent 
trolls”—companies that employ abusive ligation tactics “not to reward innovation and 
enforce intellectual property, but to threaten companies in order to extract 
settlements based on questionable claims”—since 2011); see also Richard Posner, 
Patent Trolls, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 21, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.becker-
posner-blog.com/2013/07/patent-trollsposner.html (“The term ‘patent trolls’ is a 
colloquialism that denotes what the trolls themselves prefer to call ‘patent-assertion 
entities.’  A patent troll buys patents (sometimes thousands) with the aim not of 
making the patented product or process or licensing it to others to make but of 
finding companies or individual inventors that the troll can claim with more or less 
plausibility are infringing one or more of his inventory of patents.”). 
 126. See Holman, supra note 121, at 322–23 (noting that the technology industry 
supported caps on damage awards and venue restrictions). 
 127. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 105, at 1587 n.30 (noting that in 2002, the National 
Institutes of Health spent approximately $21.6 billion in research and development). 
 128. Josh Bloom, Should Patents on Pharmaceuticals Be Extended To Encourage 
Innovation?:  Yes, Innovation Demands It, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com 
/news/articles/SB10001424052970204542404577156993191655000 (explaining that 
some of the consequences of a lack of patent protection in the pharmaceutical 
industry include “decreased innovation, fewer drugs, and more job losses”). 
 129. See Posner, supra note 125 (noting that regulatory exclusivity initially 
protected pharmaceutical companies from patent trolls).  But cf. Robin Feldman & 
W. Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling—Why Bio & Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk 6 (Univ. 
of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 93), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2395987 (arguing 
that “life sciences trolling is predictable and in its infancy”). 
 130. See Holman, supra note 121, at 323–25 (explaining that pharmaceutical 
companies were against proposed patent reforms for fear of having their patent 
rights diminished). 
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industry.131  These entities also opposed restrictions on patent 
enforcement because they rely heavily on strong patent rights to fund 
initial research and development.132 
Despite the high-technology industries’ dissatisfaction with the 
patent system, patent reform did not begin in earnest until a 2003 
report by the Federal Trade Commission133 and subsequent report by 
the National Academy of Sciences134 (NAS) criticized various aspects 
of the patent system.  The reports from the FTC and NAS identified 
various Federal Circuit doctrines that were inconsistent with the 
patent system’s goal of encouraging innovation.135  Following the 
reports from the FTC and NAS, Congress began to seriously debate 
patent reform. 
Congressional Action—On June 8, 2005, Lamar Smith, the Chairman 
of the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property, introduced the Patent Reform 
Act of 2005.136  Representative Smith characterized the Act as 
“without question, the most comprehensive change to U.S. patent law 
since Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act.”137  The bill would have 
limited inequitable conduct before the USPTO as a defense to patent 
infringement, eliminated the best mode requirement for patent 
applications, and created administrative procedures for opposing 
already-issued patents.138 
                                                          
 131. See id. at 323–27 (listing the Universities of Wisconsin-Madison, Scios, 
Therakos, and Centocor as examples). 
 132. See Carl E. Gulbrandsen et. al, Patent Reform Should Not Leave Innovation 
Behind, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 328, 333 (2009) (discussing how the 
university community generally disfavored the limitations on patent infringement 
damages proposed in patent reform bills). 
 133. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 134. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL. ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECON., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds, 2004) 
[hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
 135. Although the Patent Reform Act of 2005 adopted many of the 
recommendations from the FTC and NAS, it did not propose the sweeping changes 
that were proposed in those and other publications.  For instance, the bill also would 
have made it easier to invalidate an issued patent, id. at 9 (recommending a 
“preponderance of evidence standard for invalidity challenges”). 
 136. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 137. Patent Act of 2005:  Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (June 9, 
2005) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop.). 
 138. See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 4(a) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(1)(B) 
by removing the requirement of setting forth the best mode of carrying out the 
invention); id. § 5(a) (amending 35 U.S.C. 136(c)(3) by limiting inequitable 
conduct as a defense to patent infringement); id. § 9 (creating a variety of post-
grant review procedures). 
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In addition, the Patent Reform Act of 2005 proposed significant 
changes to the patent venue statute and patent damages law.139  The 
proposed venue reform was designed to limit forum shopping in 
patent litigation and was particularly targeted at the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas.140  The Eastern District had 
recently experienced a phenomenal period of growth in patent 
filings.141  In 2002, thirty-five patent suits were filed in the Eastern 
District of Texas; four years later, that number had jumped to 216.142  
The district’s newfound popularity was due to a combination of 
welcoming judges, infamously large jury awards, and a disinclination 
to grant motions to transfer venue.143 
Additionally, the Eastern District of Texas owed some of its success 
in attracting patent cases to the permissive patent venue provision.  
This provision, 35 U.S.C. § 1400, permits infringement suits in any 
“district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has 
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established 
place of business.”144  The Federal Circuit has interpreted a 
corporation’s residence, for purposes of § 1400, as any district with 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.145  Thus, in patent cases, 
                                                          
 139. The proposed venue provisions, as well as the proposed modifications to the 
damages provisions, were introduced via amendment.  See Amendment in the Nature of 
a Substitute to H.R. 2795, the “Patent Act of 2005”:  Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 2 (Sept. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intellectual 
Prop).  Although the substitute was never formally introduced, the draft was widely 
distributed and was the subject of committee hearings on September 15, 2005.  See 
generally id. at 1. 
 140. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”:  Lessons for Patent 
Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 119 (2008) (“The venue provisions as proposed in 
numerous congressional bills are squarely directed at the [Eastern District of Texas] 
where patent litigation has risen sharply in the last three years.”). 
 141. See id.; Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
24, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/business/24ward.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0 (indicating that “[m]ore patent suits will be filed [in Marshall, Texas] this 
year than in federal district courts in San Francisco, Chicago, New York and 
Washington” due to “[a] combination of quick trials and plaintiff-friendly juries”). 
 142. See Nguyen, supra note 140, at 130 tbl.6 (chronicling the number of cases 
filed in the Eastern District of Texas from fiscal year 2001 to 2006). 
 143. See generally Anderson, supra note 97 (arguing that the Eastern District of 
Texas’s popularity was in part due to the district’s judges’ interest in attracting 
patent litigants). 
 144. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 145. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583–84 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (applying the amended general federal venue provision, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c), to patent infringement cases); see also Moore, supra note 97, at 895–96 
(describing the conflation of the patent venue statute and the general venue statute 
in patent cases); Thomas A. O’Rourke, The Modernization of the Patent Venue Statute, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 585, 600 (1992) (stating that the patent venue statute had 
been broadened by the VE Holding and the 1998 amendment to the general 
venue provision). 
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venue is synonymous with personal jurisdiction.146  Companies that 
offer products nationally are likely to be subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of a large number of U.S. district courts, if not all ninety-
four.147  The 2005 Patent Reform Act would have tightened the venue 
standard by limiting venue to (1) districts in which the defendant had 
its principal place of business, or (2) districts in which acts of 
infringement occurred and the defendant had an established place of 
business.148  That change would have required a much stronger 
connection between the plaintiff and the location of the district court 
than that required by the then-current venue provision. 
The bill also sought to alleviate growing concerns over the Federal 
Circuit’s damages jurisprudence.149  A number of patent cases had 
resulted in very high damages awards.150  Although these high 
damage award cases were certainly outliers,151 the threat of such costly 
damage awards caused large technology companies to prefer early 
settlement of patent cases, even when many of those cases appeared 
meritless.152 
                                                          
 146. See VE Holding Corp., 917 F.2d at 1584 (“[T]he . . . test for venue under 
§ 1400(b) with respect to a defendant that is a corporation, in light of the 1988 
amendment to § 1391(c), is whether the defendant was subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the district of suit at the time the action was commenced.”). 
 147. See Megan M. LaBelle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public 
Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 69–70 (2010) (recognizing that the typical party 
sued for patent infringement is a company dealing in interstate commerce, 
essentially making it subject to personal jurisdiction in any federal court). 
 148. See Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute Hearing, supra note 139, at 2, 64 
(outlining the tests courts apply in determining what constitutes as a “principle 
place of business”). 
 149. See Johnathan M. Jackson, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It:  The Pitfalls of Major 
Reform of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement in the Wake of Knorr-Bremse, 15 U. 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37, 44–45 (2006) (discussing how the limits on damages 
through proposed abolition of the willful infringement doctrine in the 2005 Act ran 
counter to Federal Circuit precedent). 
 150. See, e.g., Advanced Med. Optics, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 03-1095-KAJ, 
2005 WL 3454283, at *1, *9–10 (D. Del. Dec. 16, 2005) (enhancing the jury’s 
damages award to over $200 million for patents covering “fluid management 
system[s]” during cataract surgery); see also Marius Meland, $ 213.9M Verdict Upheld in 
Advanced Medical Optics Case, LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.law360.com/articles 
/4806/-213-9m-verdict-upheld-in-advanced-medical-optics-case?article_related_content=1. 
 151. See J. SHAWN MCGRATH & KATHLEEN M. KADROWSKI, DAMAGES TRENDS IN 
PATENT AND LANHAM ACT CASES 2–3 (2010), available at http://apps.americanbar.org 
/litigation/committees/corporate/docs/2010-cle-materials/05-hot-topics-ip-remedies-
injunctions/05b-damages-trends-ga-bar.pdf (indicating that the average patent 
damages award between 1990 and 1999 was approximately $13.2 million with a 
median award of $2.1 million and that the top ten awards between 1982 and 2008 
“account for nearly half of the total patent damages of approximately $5 billion 
awarded since 1982”). 
 152. See, e.g., Susan Decker, Litigation Fatigue Cited in Apple, Microsoft Patent Fight, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-
25/litigation-fatigue-cited-in-apple-microsoft-patent-fight.html (quoting Tim Cook, 
the CEO of Apple, as saying “the company would ‘highly prefer to settle versus battle’ 
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Before 2005, the Federal Circuit was largely deferential to district 
court damage awards.  The court affirmed lenient application of the 
entire market value rule, a rule that awarded damages based on the 
value of the entire product.153  Observers cited the court’s failure to 
clarify damages jurisprudence as one of the principal jurisprudential 
failings of the Federal Circuit.154 
The 2005 Patent Reform Act would have restricted the discretion 
of district courts in awarding damages.  First, the bill would have 
limited the availability of enhanced damages for willful infringement 
of a patent.155  Further, the bill instructed courts to consider “if 
relevant and among other factors, the portion of the realizable value 
that should be credited to the inventive contribution.”156  This 
language explicitly identified the value of the advancement of the 
invention as a factor in damage calculations.  Presumably, a district 
court applying this directive would not grant a large damage award 
for infringement of a minor innovation.157 
The Patent Reform Act of 2006, a bill patterned after the Patent 
Reform Act of 2005 was introduced in the Senate in August 2006.158  
The Senate version of patent reform went even further than the 
House version in limiting damages in patent infringement cases.159  
                                                          
over patents,” as “the legal wrangling was taking its toll, with ‘a lot of money going to 
lawyers and things, instead of building great products for users’”). 
 153. See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1372–73 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (vacating a jury’s reasonable royalty award and remanding to determine 
lost profits based on a more expansive interpretation of the entire market value 
rule); see also Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin:  Incentives to Innovation in the New 
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 360 (2006) (“The 
most recent applications of the entire market value rule have increased the potential 
for recovery by a patentee . . . .”); Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over 
Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 695, 703–04 (2011) (noting that due to the Federal 
Circuit’s instructions, a district court had “replaced a more reliable calculation 
of damages with a notoriously unreliable one that quadrupled the original 
damages awards”). 
 154. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 76, at 12 (“Perhaps most 
surprising in view of the stakes, the court has also done less than expected with 
regard to clarifying the law on monetary damages.”). 
 155. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Doug Harvey, Comment, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System:  A Discussion of 
Patent Reform Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 1133, 1156 (“By adding this language, [s]ection 6 [of the Patent Act of 2005] 
would direct the court to consider the reasonable value of the component by itself, 
separate from the whole device or procedure, rather than follow the overgenerous 
entire market value rule.”). 
 158. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 159. The Patent Reform Act of 2006 also proposed repealing 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 
which creates infringement liability for supplying a component of a patented 
product abroad.  S. 3818, § 5(f); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012).  In 2007, 
however, the Supreme Court addressed § 271(f) in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007).  While the case was pending before the Court, Congress 
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The bill codified three factors to consider in reasonable royalty 
calculations.  First, courts should consider “the economic value that 
should be attributed to the novel and non-obvious feature or features 
of the invention.”160  Similar to the House bill, the Senate bill would 
have required courts to consider the advance of the invention as a 
factor in damage calculations.  Second, courts should look at the 
terms of non-exclusive licenses concerning the invention.161  Lastly, 
courts could consider other relevant factors.162 
Unlike Congress’s version of patent reform, the Senate bill also 
took aim at the Federal Circuit’s procedural handling of claim 
construction.163  Patent claim construction is the process of 
interpreting patent boundaries.164  Claim construction is central to 
the operation of the patent system because it defines the limits of a 
patent holder’s right to exclude165 and guides infringement and 
validity analysis.166  Not surprisingly given the doctrine’s importance, 
                                                          
removed any mention of § 271(f) from the Patent Reform Act of 2007 because “the 
provision [was] currently pending before the Supreme Court.”  Patrick Leahy, 
Leahy, Hatch, Berman and Smith Introduce Bicameral, Bipartisan Patent Reform 
Legislation, PROJECT VOTE SMART (Apr. 18, 2007), http://votesmart.org/public-
statement/254893/leahy-hatch-berman-and-smith-introduce-bicameral-bipartisan-
patent-reform-legislation#.UxGcTuOwLBY (“If the Court does not resolve the 
issue, we will revisit it in the legislative process.”).  Thus, the dialogue over patent 
reform involved not only the Federal Circuit, but the Supreme Court as well.  Cf. 
Thomas, supra note 20, at 217 (arguing that Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010), “provides potent testimony that the courts do not always possess superior 
capabilities for addressing the widely recognized problems that plague the modern 
U.S. patent system”). 
 160. S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5(a)(1)(B). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. § 3(b). 
 164. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 225 (2008) (“Claim 
construction is the process of interpreting the specific terms or phrases used by the 
patentee to define the technology covered by the patent.”). 
 165. The late Judge Giles S. Rich, an architect of 1952 Patent Act and long-serving 
member of the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, famously noted that “the name of the game is the claim.”  Giles S. 
Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 21 
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L., 497, 499 (1990); see also Kimberly A. Moore, 
Are District Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2001) 
(observing that “[d]etermining the scope of the patent claims is the most important 
issue in a patent infringement suit”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the 
Federal Circuit Succeeding?  An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105, 1119 (2004) (“[I]t is clear that claim construction plays a major—and 
perhaps the major—role in patent infringement litigation.”); William Redin 
Woodward, Particularity and Definiteness in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 757 
(1948) (characterizing claims as “all important on the measure of the grant”).  See 
generally Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 
68–73 (2006) (explaining the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence). 
 166. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts?  Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1749 (2009) (describing the claim 
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litigants frequently appeal unfavorable claim construction rulings to 
the Federal Circuit.167  Scholars examining various time periods since 
the mid-1990s have reported high claim construction reversal rates 
that have exceeded 40%.168  One district court judge has observed 
that in view of such a high reversal rate, “you might as well throw 
darts.”169  The Federal Circuit has steadfastly held that it owes no 
deference to district court claim construction rulings.170 
In light of the high reversal rates for claim construction decisions, 
many commentators proposed interlocutory review of claim 
construction decisions.171  Interlocutory review in federal cases is 
generally available only when (1) the outcome of the case would be 
determined by the appeal, (2) the appeal concerns a question of law, 
and (3) the matter would be effectively unreviewable absent 
interlocutory review.172  The Federal Circuit rarely grants 
interlocutory review of claim construction decisions.173  Thus, claim 
construction is only reviewed after the lower court reaches a final 
judgment on the merits.174  The lack of interlocutory review 
combined with the high reversal rate for claim construction resulted 
                                                          
construction process and its relation to validity and infringement); Peter S. Menell 
et al., Patent Claim Construction:  A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2010) (discussing best practices in managing 
claim construction). 
 167. See, e.g., O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Schwartz, supra note 164, at 243–44 (observing that the 
relatively low cost of appeals compared to the overall stakes in patent cases lead to 
high appeal rates). 
 168. See supra note 98.  But see Anderson & Menell, supra note 14, at 40 tbl.3 
(finding that the rate of reversal dropped to 20.4% in 2011). 
 169. Anandashankar Mazumdar, Federal District Courts Need Experts that Are Good 
‘Teachers,’ Judges Tell Bar, 70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 536, 537 (2005) 
(quoting Judge Marsha J. Penchman of the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Washington). 
 170. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (disavowing any prior opinions that hinted towards giving the USPTO 
deference and holding that the court “review[s] claim construction de novo on appeal 
including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction”). 
 171. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 165, at 34–35 (arguing that “[t]he most efficient 
way to balance the need for certainty and accuracy in patent claim scope 
determinations” is to have a “expedited appeal of the claim construction issues”); V. 
Ajay Singh, Interlocutory Appeals in Patent Cases Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2):  Are They 
Still Justified and Are They Implemented Correctly?, 55 DUKE L.J. 179, 181 (2005) 
(advocating for increased use of interlocutory appeals in patent cases). 
 172. Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498–90 (1989) (discussing the 
exception to the final judgment rule, as outlined by the Court in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
 173. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1474 (noting that interlocutory review of claim 
construction is rare, especially when compared to the number of district court level reviews). 
 174. See Moore, supra note 165, at 33–34 (emphasizing that although the Federal 
Circuit has discretionary jurisdiction to hear appeals of claim construction that occur 
during the preliminary injunction stage, the court thus far has refused all such 
interim appeals). 
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in the Federal Circuit vacating numerous bench and jury trials.175  
This state of affairs led to frustration for both the bench and the 
bar.176  Advocates argued that, given the likelihood of reversal, claim 
construction should be reviewed immediately by the appellate court, 
thereby eliminating the need to conduct a trial based on an incorrect 
understanding of claim boundaries.177 
The 2006 Patent Act would have allowed interlocutory review of 
claim construction appeals.178  The choice to include interlocutory 
review in the Senate’s version of patent reform was explicitly dialogic 
in nature.  The bill’s sponsor said that the interlocutory review 
provision was intended to “generate discussion” of the optimal 
solution for the high reversal of claim construction reversals.179  While 
that discussion was clearly intended to occur between the House and 
the Senate, it led to a dialogue with the judicial branch as well.180 
While a number of hearings were held on the initial patent reform 
bills,181 neither the Senate nor the House bill were marked up nor 
reported during the 109th congressional session.182  It was not until 
the next congressional session that patent reform legislation “began 
in earnest.”183 
B. 110th Congress (2007–2008) 
Congressional Action—On April 18, 2007, nearly identical patent 
reform bills sponsored by Senator Leahy and Congressman Berman, 
                                                          
 175. See, e.g., Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 
(1995) (vacating a jury damages award after reversing on claim construction); see 
Moore, supra note 165, at 2, 33–38 (“present[ing] the results of an empirical study 
that shows that district court judges improperly construe patent claim terms in 33% 
of the cases appealed to the Federal Circuit,” 81% of which are reversed, and 
advocating for interlocutory appeal of these decisions). 
 176. Menell et al., supra note 166, at 715 (describing the lack of a coherent claim 
construction process following Markman as prompting “a bewildering array of cases 
and rules that can overwhelm litigants, counsel, law clerks, and jurists”). 
 177. See, e.g., Moore supra note 165, at 33–38 (advocating, as “a compromise 
solution,” that the court “adopt a policy of granting interlocutory appeal of claim 
construction issues only after a grant of summary judgment of infringement or non-
infringement or at some other defined stage of the litigation proceedings”). 
 178. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8(b) (2006) 
(proposing an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2)). 
 179. 152 CONG. REC. 16,998 (2006) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 180. See supra notes 192–206 (discussing the subsequent back-and-forth between 
Congress and the Federal Circuit). 
 181. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 46–49 (2007) (listing various hearings discussing 
H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007)); S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 36–38 (2008) (listing several 
hearings on S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007)). 
 182. Matal, AIA Guide Part I,  supra note 114, at 439. 
 183. Id. 
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respectively, were introduced in the Senate and the House.184  These 
new bills proposed significant and controversial changes to the patent 
system.185  In particular, two proposals in these bills aroused 
considerable controversy.186  First, the bills proposed substantive 
changes to patent infringement damage calculations, beyond those 
proposed in the Patent Reform Act of 2006.187  The new bills capped 
reasonable royalty damage to the “economic value properly 
attributable to the patent’s specific contribution over the prior art,”188 
whereas the Patent Reform Acts of 2005 and 2006 merely considered 
the contribution over the prior art as one of a number of factors.  
The Patent Reform Acts of 2007 also contained a limit on the entire 
market value (“EMV”) rule.  The bills restricted the use of the EMV 
rule to situations in which the patented component formed the 
“predominant basis” for the product’s demand.189 
Second, the Patent Reform Acts of 2007 included mandatory 
interlocutory appeals for claim construction decisions.  The new 
proposals eliminated the final judgment requirement in order for the 
Federal Circuit to review claim construction decisions.190  The 
mandatory interlocutory provision gave district courts, rather than 
the Federal Circuit, decision making authority over interlocutory 
review of claim construction.191 
Federal Circuit Response—On May 3, 2007, while the Patent Reform 
Acts of 2007 were pending before committees, the Federal Circuit’s 
                                                          
 184. S. 1145, 110th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 18, 2007); H.R. 1908, 
110th Cong. (as introduced in House, Apr. 18, 2007).  These bills comprise “the 
Patent Reform Acts of 2007.” 
 185. The 2007 Leahy-Hatch bills dropped two controversial aspects of the 2006 
Hatch bill:  fee shifting and inequitable conduct restrictions.  Compare S. 3818, 109th 
Cong. § 5(b)–(c) (2006) (providing that the court shall award prevailing parties 
attorneys’ fees and expenses and adding an exception to the enforceability of 
patents when a party acted in bad faith), with S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5 (omitting 
these provisions). 
 186. See Matal, AIA Guide Part I, supra note 114, at 440 (indicating that the source 
of controversy were “provisions that would have redefined the standards for awarding 
damages” as well as provisions “that related to post-issuance review of patents, venue 
for infringement litigation, and interlocutory appeals of claim construction”). 
 187. Id. 
 188. S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5(a)(1); accord H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(a)(1)(C). 
 189. S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5(a)(1); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(a)(1)(C). 
 190. See Rooklidge & Barker, supra note 20, at 185–89 (outlining the inclusion of 
interlocutory appeals from the 2006 to the 2007 draft bills). 
 191. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 84 (2007) (indicating that the provision 
requiring district courts to certify an interlocutory appeal for it to proceed was 
proposed partly due to the “unusually high” reversal rate of claim construction cases 
(citing H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 11(b))); S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 28 (2008) (“The 
Committee intends to transfer the discretion from the Federal Circuit to the district 
court judge as to whether—and when—a claim construction order should be 
decided on appeal.” (citing S. 1145, 110 Cong. § 8)). 
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Chief Judge Michel responded to Congress’s reform proposals.  He 
sent a letter to Senators Leahy and Hatch expressing his opposition 
towards two aspects of the proposed legislation.192  Specifically, Chief 
Judge Michel argued that the provisions on damage apportionment 
and claim construction interlocutory appeals were unnecessary and 
incapable of being implemented by the courts.193  As for damages, he 
argued that courts were not economic experts and would be unable 
to distinguish the economic value of the inventive elements from the 
non-inventive elements.194  Making such determinations, he claimed, 
would inundate courts with extra work and invite battles between 
competing experts.195 
Regarding claim construction, Chief Judge Michel argued that 
many claim construction decisions quickly led to summary judgment 
and therefore were not in need of interlocutory review.196  Requiring 
interlocutory review, he argued, would simply prolong patent 
disputes.197  “[T]he courts as presently constituted,” Chief Judge 
Michel wrote, “simply cannot implement the provisions in a careful 
and timely manner.”198  If Congress was sincere when it expressed its 
desire to “generate discussion” on patent reform,199 Judge Michel’s 
letter weighing in against interlocutory review certainly fulfilled 
Congress’s wish. 
Just one month later, Chief Judge Michel sent another letter to 
Shanna Winters, Chief Counsel to the House Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property.200  In this letter, Chief 
Judge Michel argued that damages law was “highly stable and well 
                                                          
 192. See Letter from Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fed. Circuit, to Senators Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary (May 3, 2007), available at http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/attachments 
/patentdamages/05-03-07Michelletter.pdf (questioning whether these provisions, “if 
enacted, . . . could be effectively and efficiently administered by the courts, 
particularly the Federal Circuit”). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. (indicating that “[t]he new provision could double” already long delays 
in patent cases). 
 198. Id.  
 199. Cf. supra note 179 (quoting the Senator who sponsored the Patent Reform 
Act of 2006). 
 200. Letter from Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. 
Circuit, to Shanna A. Winters, Chief Counsel, H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
& Intellectual Prop. (June 7, 2007), available at http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com 
/wp-content/uploads/sites/98/2007/06/Michel-letter-to-Winters.pdf. 
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understood by litigators as well as judges.”201  He suggested that 
Congress should “do nothing” concerning damages.202 
Congressional Response—Chief Judge Michel’s lobbying efforts 
urging legislative inaction on damages and claim construction 
received mixed results.  His suggestion to do nothing on damage 
reform was initially ignored by Congress, as Congress made changes 
to the damage portions of the bills despite Chief Judge Michel’s 
criticisms.203  After mark-up, however, Congress’s bill included more 
modest changes to the law of patent damages than the earlier 
version’s provisions.204  The bill also contained new damages 
provisions addressing “combination inventions.”205  The Senate bill 
maintained the “inventive contribution” requirement for establishing 
a reasonable royalty, but limited the use of such a calculation to 
situations in which the EMV rule did not apply and in which actual, 
established royalties did not exist.206 
After a bruising three-day battle on the House floor, the House 
version of the bill was passed by a vote of 220 to 175.207  The Leahy 
bill, however, failed to pass the Senate.208  Despite this failure, 
Senators Leahy and Hatch reaffirmed their commitment to passing 
patent reform legislation in the subsequent congressional term.209  
The senators recognized that certain areas remained overly 
contentious and would require further refinement, namely, damages, 
venue,210 inequitable conduct, and post-grant review.211 
                                                          
 201. Id. at 1. 
 202. Id. 
 203. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007) 
(demonstrating modifications to damages in both House and Senate versions of 
reform despite Chief Judge Michel’s warning). 
 204. See S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4 (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 18, 2007); H.R. 
1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007). 
 205. See S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4(a) (“In the case of a combination invention 
whose elements are present individually in the prior art, the contribution over the 
prior art may include the value of the additional function resulting from the 
combination, as well as the enhanced value, if any, of some or all of the prior art 
elements as part of the combination, if the patentee demonstrates that value.”); H.R. 
1908, 110th Cong. § 5(a)(3) (“[I]n the case of a combination invention the elements 
of which are present individually in the prior art, the patentee may show that the 
contribution over the prior art may include the value of the additional function 
resulting from the combination, as well as the enhanced value, if any, of some or all 
of the prior art elements resulting from the combination.”). 
 206. S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4. 
 207. 153 CONG. REC. H10,307 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (recorded vote). 
 208. See Greg Hitt, Patent Bill Hits Impasse in the Senate, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2008, 12:01 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120848284744025135 (reporting that Senate 
negotiations “broke[] down amid concerns among some senators about proposed changes 
in the way damage awards would be made”). 
 209. See 153 CONG. REC. S15899 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep. Leahy). 
 210. On July 12, 2007, for example, Senator Specter introduced an amendment to 
the Senate version of the bill that would have limited venue in patent cases.  Michael C. 
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Congress was more receptive to the Chief Judge’s lobbying efforts 
regarding interlocutory review.  After being marked-up in committee, 
both bills removed the mandatory interlocutory review provisions, 
just as Michel had requested.212  Under the marked-up versions, 
district judges would be required to certify claim construction 
decisions and would be able to choose whether to stay proceedings in 
the interim.213  Thus, while the bills still provided for interlocutory 
review, after Chief Judge Michel’s letter to Senators Leahy and Hatch, 
the proposals permitted, but did not require, such review.214 
                                                          
Smith, “A Battle Over Where the War Is To Be Fought”:  Venue in Patent Cases, THE 
ADVOCATE, Winter 2007, at 10, 11.  The new provisions would have limited venue to 
judicial districts in which (1) the defendant had its principal place of business; (2) the 
defendant has “committed substantial acts of infringement” or has a “substantial” 
physical facility that constitutes a “substantial” portion of defendant’s operations; or (3) 
the plaintiff resides if the plaintiff is an institute of higher learning or an individual 
inventor.  Id.  The new, more restrictive venue provision was aimed at reducing the 
patent docket in the Eastern District of Texas.  See Cornyn Pledges To Fight for Fairness for 
Eastern District of Texas Courts, JOHN CORNYN U.S. SENATOR FOR TEX. (July 13, 2007), 
http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id
=bfff8e84-802a-23ad-4c98-3620b47148c2 (complaining that the new provision would 
make “waste of the experience and expertise” of the Eastern District of Texas judges); 
see also supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning behind 
the influx of patent cases filed in this district). 
 211. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 210, at 10 (discussing that the 2007 Patent Act 
allows a party to challenge a granted patent’s validity before the USPTO). 
 212. Compare S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8(b) (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 18, 2007) 
(mandating a stay of court proceedings when an interlocutory appeal is made), with 
S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8(b) (as reported by Sen. Leahy, Jan. 24, 2008) (granting 
district courts “discretion whether to approve” the interlocutory appeal application 
and whether to stay proceedings during pendency of the appeal); see also H.R. 1908, 
110th Cong. § 11 (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007) (granting discretion over 
interlocutory appeals to district court judges). 
 213. S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 8 (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 18, 2007); H.R. 1908, 
110th Cong. § 11. 
 214. Compare S. 1145, 110th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 18, 2007); 
(“Application for an appeal under paragraph (3) shall be made to the court within 
10 days after entry of the order or decree, and proceedings in the district court 
under such paragraph shall be stayed during pendency of the appeal.”), and H.R. 
1908, 110th Cong. § 11(b) (as introduced in House, Apr. 18, 2007) (same), with S. 
1145, 110th Cong. § 4 (as reported by Sen. Leahy, Jan. 24, 2008) (“Application for an 
appeal under paragraph (3) shall be made to the court within 10 days after entry of 
the order or decree; judge has discretion on whether to approve the application; and 
proceedings in the district court under such paragraph may at the Judge’s discretion be 
stayed during pendency of the appeal.” (emphasis added)), and H.R. 1908, 110th 
Cong. § 5 (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007) (“Application for an appeal under 
paragraph (3) shall be made to the court within 10 days after entry of the order or 
decree.  The district court shall have discretion whether to approve the application and, if so, 
whether to stay proceedings in the district court during the pendency of such appeal.” 
(emphasis added)).  See generally supra notes 193, 196–99 (discussing Chief Judge 
Michel’s views, which he expressed in a letter sent to Senators Leahy and Hatch on 
May 3, 2007, that the proposed changes to interlocutory appeal would result in 
unnecessary delay). 
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Federal Circuit Response—The Federal Circuit continued to monitor 
action on the Hill.215  In late 2008, the Chief Judge signaled the 
court’s new direction in the patent reform dialogue:  instead of direct 
lobbying, the court would use its judicial review power to shape the 
patent system.216  In a speech before the Annual Meeting of the 
Intellectual Property Owners, Chief Judge Michel suggested that 
many of the issues embodied in the various patent reform proposals 
were better left to the court.217  Before an audience largely comprised 
of patent litigators, the Chief Judge urged practitioners to use the en 
banc petition process to raise legal challenges to calcified 
precedent.218  He further suggested that the court was open to 
altering its damages case law, stating that in his twenty years on the 
court he could not “remember a case raising these [damages] 
issues.”219  The Chief Judge’s plea for patent stakeholders to approach 
his court, rather than Congress or the Supreme Court, would not go 
unanswered.  The subsequent term saw the emergence of a Federal 
Circuit with a docket full of important issues and a confidence in its 
vision of patent policy.220 
On the issue of venue, the court took a more subtle track in 
shaping the law.  Instead of engaging directly with senators via official 
correspondence as it previously had done, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 215. See 2007–2010 Patent Law Reform Archive, FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 
http://www.fr.com/patentreformarchive (providing a timeline of events 
surrounding patent reform).  On February 4, 2008, the Executive Branch also 
weighed in on patent reform.  See Letter from Nathaniel F. Wienecke, Assistant Sec’y 
for Legislative & Intergovernmental Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to Senator 
Patrick J. Leahy, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary  (Feb. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2014/january/s11450204
08.pdf (indicating, in a six-page letter, that the Bush Administration opposed the 
current patent reform bill in its entirety and would continue to do so until the 
damages provisions were significantly revised); see also Jennifer Rankin Byrne, Commerce 
Under Secretary To Address Bush Administration’s Views on Patent Reform Act of 2007, U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2008/08-
05.jsp (explaining that the day after this letter was sent, John Dudas, the Director of 
the USPTO would hold a teleconference to reinforce the Administration’s 
opposition to the bill).  
 216. 2007–2010 Patent Law Reform Archive, supra note 215 (explaining that Chief 
Judge Michel, in a speech given at the annual meeting of Intellectual Property 
Owners on September 23, 2008, had previously alluded to this idea). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. (quoting Chief Judge Michel as stating he thought it was “interesting” 
that KSR bypassed our en banc process”); see also infra note 365 (discussing KSR Int’l 
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)). 
 219. 2007–2010 Patent Law Reform Archive, supra note 215 (noting how Chief Judge 
Michel, in a “follow-up email correspondence with BNA,” suggested that 90% of the 
needed corrections for inequitable conduct were “within the power of our court”). 
 220. See infra Part III.B (outlining the Federal Circuit’s response to various 
legislative actions in terms of its damages jurisprudence). 
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exercised its discretionary power of mandamus.221  From its inception 
in 1982 until 2008, the Federal Circuit never granted a writ of 
mandamus to overturn a transfer of venue decision.222  That changed 
in December 2008 when the court granted mandamus review in In re 
TS Tech USA Corp.223  After a denial of a motion to transfer out of the 
Eastern District of Texas, the Federal Circuit reversed, establishing a 
new standard for transfer motions of patent cases.224  The Federal 
Circuit held that the district court had given “inordinate weight to 
the plaintiff’s choice of venue,” ignored the factors of convenience to 
non-parties and the public interest in localized matters, and 
improperly analyzed the factor of access to sources of proof.225  In the 
years following TS Tech, the Federal Circuit has taken a much more 
active role in policing denials of motions to transfer.226 
Had the Patent Reform Acts of 2007 passed, Congress would have 
amended the patent venue statute for much the same reason that the 
Federal Circuit began policing denial of transfer motions:  to limit 
the influence of the Eastern District of Texas.227  But the court’s 
actions were spurred by Congress’s proposed alteration to patent 
venue standards. 
C. 111th Congress (2009–2010) 
Congressional Action—On March 3, 2009, a slightly modified version 
of the Patent Reform Acts of 2007 was introduced in both the House 
                                                          
 221. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. 
REV. 343 (2012) (describing that the difficulties in getting Congress to act has lead 
the court to use its mandamus power to combat forum shopping, particularly in the 
Eastern District of Texas). 
 222. See id. at 346 (describing how the Federal Circuit denied over twenty petitions 
on the issue). 
 223. 551 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 224. See id. at 1317–19.  The Federal Circuit’s ruling was based on the court’s 
interpretation of the law of the Fifth Circuit, which held in In re Volkswagen of America, 
Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2007), that cases should be transferred when another 
venue is “clearly more convenient,” TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1319. 
 225. Id. at 1320–21. 
 226. See Gugliuzza, supra note 221, at 346 (elaborating that the court’s increasing 
“use of mandamus to repeatedly overturn discretionary, non-appealable rulings of 
one district court is unprecedented in any federal court of appeals”); Elizabeth P. 
Offen-Brown, Note, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases:  Marshall’s 
Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 62, 66–67 (2010) 
(observing how the Federal Circuit’s increasing grant of mandamus petitions has 
added “to the precedential weight of the Fifth Circuit and the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions”).  The Federal Circuit has granted writs to overturn denials of motions to 
transfer in eleven cases since 2008, ten of which arose from the Eastern District of 
Texas.  Gugliuzza, supra note 221, at 343. 
 227. See Nguyen, supra note 140, at 147–51 (describing that the Patent Reform Act 
of 2007 contained the same provision as the 2005 Senate bill that limited the venue 
to the judicial districts where either party resides). 
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and Senate.228  On the same day that the Patent Reform Act of 2009 
was introduced, Senator Arlen Specter sent a letter to the Judiciary 
Committee asking that argument on the bill be delayed until late 
May.229  Citing “the symbiotic relationship between the judicial and 
legislative branches with regard to changes to the patent system,” 
Specter suggested that the then-upcoming argument in Lucent 
Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.230 at the Federal Circuit might 
“facilitate a compromise or clarify the applicability of damages theories 
in various contexts.”231  Specter asked his colleagues to defer debate on 
the patent bills so that the Federal Circuit could attempt to modify the 
damages jurisprudence that had proven so controversial.232 
Federal Circuit Response—In March 2009, Judge Rader presided over 
a patent trial in the Northern District of New York.233  The case 
presented him an opportunity to clarify the Federal Circuit’s damages 
jurisprudence.  In Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,234 a jury 
awarded $184 million in damages for Hewlett-Packard’s infringement 
of Cornell’s patent covering computer processing technology.235  
Cornell’s damage calculation was based on a percentage of the over 
$23 billion total market value of Hewlett-Packard’s “CPU bricks,” 
despite the fact that the patented invention was only a small 
component of the brick.236  Judge Rader took issue with Cornell’s 
application of the entire market value rule.237  While conceding that 
the EMV rule could apply to a situation in which the royalty base is 
broader than the invention, Judge Rader stated that the EMV rule 
applied “only upon proof that damages on the unpatented 
components or technology is necessary to fully compensate for 
infringement of the patented invention.”238  Thus, Rader emphasized 
the high evidentiary standard that such a rule required.239  Rader 
                                                          
 228. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 
2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 229. Letter from Senator Arlen Specter to Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick 
Leahy, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.fr.com/files 
/uploads/attachments/patentdamages/03-03-09-Specter-to-PJL-Patents.pdf. 
 230. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 231. Letter from Senator Arlen Specter to Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick 
Leahy, supra note 229. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 
(N.D.N.Y.), amended by 654 F. Supp. 2d 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (indicating that Judge 
Rader was sitting on the district court by designation). 
 234. 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y.), amended by 654 F. Supp. 2d 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 235. Id. at 282. 
 236. Id. at 282–83. 
 237. See id. at 289 (finding that the record contained no reasonable basis to apply 
the EMV rule to Hewlett-Packard’s products). 
 238. Id. at 284–85. 
 239. See id. at 292. 
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granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) and 
reduced the damage award from $184 million to $53 million.240 
Although the Cornell case was not binding on district judges around 
the country, as a sitting Federal Circuit Judge,241 Rader’s decision 
carried significant persuasive value.  Practitioners noted that the case 
signaled a Federal Circuit suddenly more willing to entertain 
arguments about incongruous damage awards.242  Indeed, many saw 
Cornell as evidence that the Federal Circuit, and not Congress, was the 
proper venue to restructure damages law.243  The headline of a news 
story about the case announced that “The Courts Beat Congress To 
Patent Reform (Again).”244 
Congressional Response—The Senate bill was voted out of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on April 2, 2009.245  During the markup process, 
many of the more contentious aspects of the bill were modified or 
eliminated.246  For instance, the more stringent requirements for 
                                                          
 240. Id. at 293. 
 241. When Judge Rader presided over Cornell, he had been sitting on the Federal 
Circuit bench for nearly a decade and was close to being sworn in as Chief Judge.  See 
Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts 
.gov/judges/randall-r-rader-chief-judge.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014) (indicating 
that President George H.W. Bush appointed Rader to the court in 1990 and that he 
has been Chief Judge since June 1, 2010); see also Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, 
Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel Announces that He Is Leaving the Bench, PATENTLY-
O (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/11/federal-circuit-chief-
judge-paul-michel-announces-that-he-is-leaving-the-bench.html (describing Judge 
Rader as a “great friend of the [Federal] Circuit and its community”). 
 242. See, e.g., Michael J. Kasdan & Joseph Casino, Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing 
and Slashing Patent Damage Awards, 2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 24, 35–36 (concluding 
that Cornell and its progeny “indicate an emerging trend to more carefully scrutinize 
the evidentiary and economic basis of . . . patent damage awards”); James R. Kyper & 
Roberto Capriotti, District Court Tightens Requirements for Applying Entire Market Value 
Rule in Cornell’s Patent Infringement Damages Case Against Hewlett-Packard, K&L GATES 
LLP 3 (Apr. 2009), http://www.klgates.com/files/tempFiles/38fd509b-0f07-42bd-
a0e0-6678a83d036a/Alert_IP_Cornell_041509.pdf (“The decision is noteworthy 
because it was made by Judge Rader, who normally sits on the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.  Therefore, the decision may suggest a more limited application 
of the EMV Rule that may find other allies at the Federal Circuit.”). 
 243. See, e.g., Mark A. Flagel et al., The Law of Patent Damages:  Who Will Have the 
Final Say?, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 1 (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.lw.com/thought 
Leadership/law-of-patent-damages-lucent-damages-case (alerting clients that the 
Cornell decision “support[s] the argument that courts are fully equipped to police 
patent damages awards without legislative intervention”). 
 244. Bernard Chao, The Courts Beat Congress to Patent Reform (Again), LAW360 (Aug. 
31, 2009), http://chsblaw.com/downloads/The_Courts_Beat_Congress_To_Patent 
_Reform.pdf. 
 245. See S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 31–32 (2009) (indicating that the bill received four 
yeas and thirteen nays, with two not partaking in the vote). 
 246. See id. at 30–31 (providing a section-by-section analysis of how the 
amendment changed the Act); Matal, AIA Guide Part I, supra note 114, at 442 
(observing that, among other changes, the amendment altered the substantive 
damages standards and JMOL rules). 
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proving reasonable royalty provisions were dropped.247  Instead, the 
bill codified a “gatekeeper” role for the district judge, instructing the 
jury on the methodologies and factors that have a legally sufficient 
basis for calculating damage awards.248 
Furthermore, the bill that came out of the markup process limited 
the availability of interlocutory appeals of claim construction.  Now 
such appeals were available only when a sufficient evidentiary record 
existed and an immediate appeal would likely determine the ultimate 
outcome of the case.249  Finally, the venue provision of the new bill 
was dropped and replaced with a provision requiring transfer of cases 
upon a showing that the transferee district is clearly more 
convenient.250  This new venue provision codified the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in TS Tech.251 
Federal Circuit Response—The modified interlocutory review 
provisions were not satisfactory to Chief Judge Michel, however.  In 
June of 2009, Judge Michel continued his public relations campaign 
against interlocutory review.252  In a speech to the Federal Circuit Bar 
Association Annual Bench-Bar Conference, he suggested that 
interlocutory review was “[t]he greatest threat to speedy dispositions” 
at the Federal Circuit.253  Furthermore, he predicted that permissive 
interlocutory review would double both the amount of cases at the 
Federal Circuit and the average disposition time for patent appeals.254  
He concluded by expressing hope that the Federal Circuit Bar 
                                                          
 247. S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 31 (indicating that this language was “replaced with 
enhanced procedural protections”). 
 248. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009); see also S. REP. 
NO. 111-18, at 10 (explaining that under section 4 of the bill, the court shall fulfill its 
“gatekeeper responsibilities” by considering improper theories, methodologies, or 
opinions that could be burdensome or confusing to juries). 
 249. S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8; see S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 19–21, 38 (describing the 
rationale behind the Leahy-Specter-Feinstein amendment’s changes to section 8). 
 250. S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8; see S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 18–19, 31, 38. 
 251. See S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 19 (indicating that TS Tech showed the court’s 
“increased willingness to issue writs of mandamus to transfer venue when another 
venue is clearly more convenient”); see also Donald Zuhn, House Judiciary Committee 
Holds Hearing on Patent Reform, PAT. DOCS (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.patentdocs.org 
/2009/04/house-judiciary-committee-holds-hearing-on-patent-reform.html (citing to 
several examples of testimony in which experts explained the troubling effects of 
expanding post-grant review in light of recent Federal Circuit decisions); supra notes 
223–26 (discussing TS Tech and its impact). 
 252. See Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, 
2009 State of the Court Speech at the Federal Circuit Bar Association Annual Bench-
Bar Conference (June 19, 2009) (prepared remarks available at http://www.cafc.us 
courts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2009/soc09.pdf). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
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Association “and the entire patent bar will advise and caution 
Congress on this issue.”255 
On September 14, 2009, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in 
Lucent—the opinion for which Senator Specter had been waiting.256  
This opinion was the first in a series in which the Federal Circuit 
significantly revamped the law of damages in patent cases.257  Written 
by Chief Judge Michel, the opinion overturned a $358 million award 
against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) by conducting a 
meticulous review of reasonable royalty methodology.258  The court 
found that the district judge had improperly used the EMV rule by using 
the value of the sale of computers rather than only the patented 
portions of the software.259  Furthermore, the court found that the 
royalty rate adopted by the jury lacked a valid evidentiary foundation.260 
The Federal Circuit continued to issue important damage decisions 
throughout 2009.  In i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,261 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court damage award of $200 million 
for Microsoft’s infringement of a patented software component.262  In 
doing so, however, the court chastised Microsoft’s counsel for failing 
to challenge the damage award in the lower court.263  The court 
stated that “[h]ad Microsoft filed a pre-verdict JMOL, it is true that 
the outcome might have been different.”264  This admonishment to 
                                                          
 255. Id. 
 256. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see supra 
notes 229–32 (describing Senator Specter’s plea to the Judiciary Committee to delay 
the bill until Lucent was decided). 
 257. See Bo Zeng, Note, Lucent v. Gateway:  Putting the “Reasonable” Back into 
Reasonable Royalties, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 329, 341–47 (2011) (discussing the post-
Lucent cases at the Federal Circuit); see also infra notes 261–76 (discussing the other 
cases in which the Federal Circuit increased its scrutiny of damages awards). 
 258. Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1308.  On October 5, 2009, U.S. Department of 
Commerce Secretary Gary Locke wrote to the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating 
that “the Department of Commerce supports the bill.”  See Letter from Gary Locke, 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation 
/locke-letter-oct-05-2009.pdf (noting that substantial work had been done, especially 
in relation to damages and that the Department of Commerce endorsed the current 
gatekeeper approach). 
 259. See Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1338. 
 260. See id. at 1337–38 (dismissing how the district court recognized damages 
using the EMV approach). 
 261. 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).  The panel, on 
rehearing in this case, withdrew and replaced the court’s prior opinion in i4i Ltd. 
Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  However, the panel only 
reheard the case “for the limited purpose of revising portions of the discussion of 
willfulness”; thus, the discussion on damages remains the same.  See i4i Ltd., 598 F.3d 
at 864. 
 262. i4i Ltd., 598 F.3d at 839, 864. 
 263. See id. at 845, 856–57. 
 264. Id. at 857. 
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challenge damage awards signaled to litigants that the Federal Circuit 
was receptive to damage challenges. 
In February of 2010, the court further tightened the evidentiary 
standards for damage awards.  In ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,265 
the court vacated a lower court damage award because the plaintiff’s 
expert had relied on improper licensing evidence.266  Again relying 
on its Lucent precedent, the court found that the licenses relied upon 
by the expert in calculating damages covered both the patented 
technology as well as additional, unpatented services.267  Inclusion of 
these extraneous services rendered the licenses “inapposite” for 
purposes of calculating damages.268 
A year after sitting by designation in New York, Judge Rader 
presided over another district court patent case, this time in the 
Eastern District of Texas.269  His opinion in the case outlined the 
evidentiary standards for patent damage judgments.270  Again 
highlighting the role of district courts as gatekeepers, Judge Rader 
first rejected the plaintiff’s request to use the EMV rule to calculate 
damages, then threw out testimony of the plaintiff’s damages expert 
regarding a reasonable royalty because the expert had failed to “show 
a sound economic connection between the claimed invention and 
this broad proffered royalty base.”271 
Finally, the Federal Circuit tightened its damages jurisprudence 
even further in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.272  In that case the 
court overturned a $388 million verdict against Microsoft.273  First, 
the court ruled that “the 25 percent rule of thumb” for patent royalty 
rates was “fundamentally flawed.”274  While noting that the court had 
“passively tolerated” the rule in past cases, the court emphasized that 
there was no support for the rule of thumb in the software industry’s 
licensing practices.275  Lastly, the court rejected the use of the EMV rule 
                                                          
 265. 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 266. See id. at 869–73. 
 267. See id. at 870–71. 
 268. Id. at 872. 
 269. See IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 688 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
 270. Id. at 688–91 (explaining that expert testimony is subject to the Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), test and must meet rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to be considered relevant and reliable, then applying the 
test in the patent law damages context where expert testimony provides the basis for 
economic damages). 
 271. Id. at 689–91. 
 272. 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 273. See id. at 1295, 1311 (affirming the district court’s grant of a new trial on 
damages “[b]ecause the jury’s damages award was fundamentally tainted by the use 
of a legally inadequate methodology”). 
 274. Id. at 1315. 
 275. Id. at 1314–15. 
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in the case, finding that the patented software component was not the 
primary driver of customer demand for Microsoft’s Word software.276 
The flurry of noteworthy patent damages decisions from the 
Federal Circuit, both on appeal and by designation at the district 
court level, signaled the court’s willingness to revisit its damages 
jurisprudence.  Not everyone was satisfied with the court’s 
decisions,277 but most observers welcomed the court’s new scrutiny of 
damages awards.278 
Congressional Response—In March of 2010, further changes were 
introduced to the Patent Reform Act of 2009 via a managers’ 
amendment.279  The amended version completely eliminated 
interlocutory review of claim construction decisions.280  Provisions 
providing for interlocutory review have not appeared again in 
                                                          
 276. Id. at 1320. 
 277. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 20, at 214 (“The Lucent case does not appear to 
have achieved consensus in the patent community . . . .  High technology industry 
has continued to voice concerns over damages awards in the patent area.”). 
 278. See, e.g., Zeng, supra note 257, at 366 (concluding that the Federal Circuit’s 
damages decisions “have improved the patent damages system and should help 
prevent excessively large jury awards in the future”). 
 279. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (amendment in the 
nature of a substitute).  “A Manager’s Amendment is a package of numerous 
individual amendments agreed to by both sides in advance.  The managers are the 
majority and the minority member who manage the debate on a bill for their side.”  
Manager’s Amendment Definition, C-SPAN CONG. GLOSSARY, http://legacy.c-span.org/guide 
/congress/glossary/manamend.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
While no official public version of the 2010 managers’ amendment exists, a draft is 
available online, and many commentators have discussed the amendment on various 
patent weblogs.  See Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong. (Mar. 4, 2010) 
(draft amendment in the nature of a substitute to be proposed to the Senate), 
available at http://www.aipla.org/Advocacy%20Shared%20Documents/LEG_2009-
03-03_111C_S.515_MgrsAmend.pdf; see, e.g., A Bipartisan Jobs and Economic Stimulus 
We Need:  Enact S. 515—the Patent Reform Act of 2010, COALITION FOR 21ST CENTURY PAT. 
REFORM (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/pdfs/20100304_bipartisan 
_jobs_bill.pdf (describing the benefits of the managers’ amendment and 
advocating that it “strikes an appropriate balance among all stakeholders”); see also 
Leahy, Sessions, Hatch, Schumer, Kyl, Kaufman Unveil Details of Patent Reform Agreement, 
SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Details of Patent Reform 
Amendment], http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=8b0f5bb3-
121b-484a-b0b7-092d7bdee1ac (detailing what the amendment preserves and 
changes about the Patent Reform Act of 2009). 
 280. See Details of Patent Reform Amendment, supra note 279 (indicating that the 2010 
managers’ amendment excised the provision on interlocutory appeals that was 
present in the Patent Reform Act of 2009 and modified the damages provision by 
codifying the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisprudence surrounding willfulness).  See 
generally In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(establishing that to show willfulness, a patentee must provide clear and convincing 
evidence that the infringer acted in spite of “an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent”). 
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proposals for patent reform; Chief Judge Michel’s efforts to defeat 
changes to interlocutory review have proven successful.281 
On May 31, 2010, Chief Judge Michel retired from the bench.282  A 
few weeks later, in an interview with Bloomberg BNA, he stated that 
Congress was “just aiming at the wrong target.”283  He indicated that 
Congress should focus on funding the USPTO and that all of the 
changes aimed at patent cases were unnecessary.284  The House 
Judiciary Committee Chair, Congressman Conyers, disagreed with 
the former Chief Judge:  “Congress, not the courts,” Conyers argued, 
“must clarify and update patent law.”285  This debate ignored reality, 
however.  Both Congress and the Federal Circuit had shaped patent 
law—both substantively and procedurally.  Neither branch could 
claim complete control of shaping patent law. 
D. The America Invents Act:  112th Congress 
On January 25, 2011, Senator Leahy introduced the bill that would 
become the AIA.286  Very similar to the 2010 manager’s amendment 
to the Patent Reform Act of 2009,287 the bill was quickly brought to 
the Senate floor.288  On March 1, 2011, Congress adopted a 
manager’s amendment that significantly altered the bill’s damages 
                                                          
 281. See Matal, AIA Guide Part I, supra note 114, at 443 (indicating that procedural 
issues kept the revised bill from being considered during the 111th Congress).  The 
Federal Circuit also began to revisit its troubled case law on inequitable conduct 
during the pending of the Patent Reform Act of 2009.  See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(granting a petition for en banc rehearing and vacating its prior decision).  Chief 
Judge Rader had described abusive inequitable conduct litigation as “an absolute 
plague” to the patent system, and indeed the case law was split as to the proper 
standard to apply to attorney conduct before the USPTO.  See Therasense, Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287–89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  While the en 
banc case was not decided until after the AIA had passed, the grant of en banc review 
signaled yet again the court’s willingness to confront issues pending before Congress. 
 282. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:  Paul Redmond Michel, FED. JUD. CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1633&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2014). 
 283. 2007–2010 Patent Law Reform Archive, supra note 215. 
 284. Id. (“None of the actions that the provisions would require inside a 
courthouse are prohibited today.  All are available tools that the district court judges 
have right now.”). 
 285. Id. (“The patent system is simply not up to the challenges of the 21st century 
and is handicapping the American knowledge economy.”). 
 286. Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Jan. 
25, 2011). 
 287. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text (discussing the 2010 
managers’ amendment, which due to procedural issues, was never introduced in 
Congress); see also 157 CONG. REC. S1366–67 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 288. Matal, AIA Guide Part I, supra note 114, at 444 (indicating that the bill was 
brought to the floor on February 28, 2011). 
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and post-grant provisions.289  Once that amendment was adopted, 
three of the provisions that had proven most controversial during the 
legislative process had been completely excised—provisions affecting 
the award of damages, venue in infringement actions, and 
interlocutory appeals of claim construction rulings.290  On March 8, 
2011, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of ninety-five to five.291 
Following the Senate’s adoption of the AIA, Congressman Lamar 
Smith introduced in the House an alternate version of the patent 
reform bill.292  Two weeks later, the House passed the bill.293  After 
further amendments to bring the two bills into agreement, the Senate 
passed the AIA on September 8, 2011.294  The three issues that the 
Federal Circuit had opposed during the process were completely 
absent from the AIA, which President Obama signed into law on 
September 16, 2011.295 
III. CATALYZING JUDICIAL REFORM:  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF 
PATENT LAW 
Before the passage of the AIA, Congress rarely engaged in dialogue 
with the courts over patent reform, preferring instead to allow the 
Federal Circuit to control change in the patent system.296  During this 
period, the Federal Circuit greatly expanded its control over patent 
law.297  As detailed in Part II, however, Congress has recently 
reasserted its role in crafting patent policy by establishing a dialogic 
relationship with the Federal Circuit.298 
                                                          
 289. Id. at 445. 
 290. Id. 
 291. 157 CONG. REC. S1381 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 292. America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (as introduced in House, Mar. 
30, 2011).  The House bill differed from the Senate version in numerous ways, 
including in its creation of a limited prior user right defense for utility patents, 
limitations on joinder in patent infringement litigation, and various procedural and 
funding changes to the USPTO.  Matal, AIA Guide Part I, supra note 114, at 445–46. 
 293. 157 CONG. REC. H4505 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (indicating that the bill 
passed with 304 ayes, 117 nays, and 10 not voting). 
 294. 157 CONG. REC. S5442 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (listing eighty-nine yeas and 
nine nays, with two not voting); see Matal, AIA Guide Part I, supra note 114, at 446–47 
(elucidating that the House and Senate both compromised to reach a bill both sides 
would pass). 
 295. See President Obama Signs America Invents Act, supra note 116; see also Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in 
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 296. See supra Part I.A (explaining the background of the Federal Circuit). 
 297. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s 
repeated attempts to consolidate its power). 
 298. See supra Part II (tracing the relationship that emerged between Congress and 
the Federal Circuit during and the passage of AIA). 
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The Federal Circuit’s recently established relationship with 
Congress differs from relationships the court has with other 
institutions.299  As the branch with legislative powers, Congress can 
statutorily override Federal Circuit decisions.  It can also signal the 
areas of patent law that are in need of reform by proposing legislative 
adjustments.  This Part suggests that Congress’s newfound catalytic 
role in patent reform has the potential to reshape the manner in 
which patent reform takes place in the United States. 
A. Congress as Catalyst 
Congress’s power to legislate is unquestioned.  Article II of the 
Constitution grants the legislative branch the power to create law.300  
Despite Congress’s monopoly on law making, scholars have theorized 
that the other branches of government can engage in a dialogic 
relationship with Congress.301  Inter-branch dialogue permits the non-
legislative branches to express criticism or skepticism over Congress’s 
decisions, spur Congress to action in areas in which a particular 
branch has an acute interest, and help shape the power of the non-
legislative branches in light of Congress’s singular ability to define 
that role.302 
Congress’s dialogic relationship with the courts is somewhat 
different with regard to patent law.303  Because of the existence of a 
specialized appellate court in the area, Congress can defer some 
                                                          
 299. See supra note 11 (providing examples of scholarly works that discuss the 
relationship between the Federal Circuit and Congress); see also Gugliuzza, supra note 
8, at 1827 (noting that the Federal Circuit engages in “indirect dialogue” with 
Congress when it changes laws in response to legislative proposals); Burk, supra note 
25, at 22 (observing that pressing issues before Congress have been “rendered moot 
by judicial resolution”).  While accurate, these accounts focus on the Federal 
Circuit’s desire to increase or maintain its control over patent law. 
 300. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7. 
 301. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:  Protecting Fundamental 
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1583 
(2001) (discussing the ways in which the branches of government engage in dialogue 
with one another and demonstrating that “[t]hrough the use of [structural 
doctrines] and many other process-centered rules, the [Supreme] Court initiates a 
dialogue with and among nonjudicial actors, often deferring to decisions of political 
branches on how to resolve constitutional issues, so long as those decisions bear the 
earmarks of deliberation and care”). 
 302. See, e.g., id. at 1582 (“Often the [Supreme] Court directly engages nonjudicial 
officials in a shared elaboration of constitutional rights . . . through the use of 
doctrines that focus on whether nonjudicial actors have taken an appropriately close 
and sensitive look at policy judgments that threaten important constitutional values.  
In many of these cases, the Court in effect “remands” constitutionally controversial 
programs to the political branches—inviting a more studied consideration of the 
program than attended its initial adoption, and leaving open the possibility that the 
readopted program will be upheld against constitutional attack.”). 
 303. See generally supra Part II (outlining the evolution of patent reform). 
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policy-like decisions to the Federal Circuit.  As Part II of this Article 
demonstrated, during passage of the AIA, Congress crafted reform 
legislation to remedy problems in the patent system.304  Those 
legislative proposals were often intended to spark a dialogue between 
Congress and the courts.305 
Of course, Congress and the Federal Circuit did not engage in 
discussion over every issue in the patent reform proposals.  Many 
other elements of the legislation were passed without Federal Circuit 
response, such as changes to the joinder rules in patent cases.306  
Tellingly, however, many of the changes that Congress did enact were 
directed at aspects of the patent system over which the Federal 
Circuit has little or no control.  For instance, Congress changed the 
U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system, 
a change that could only have been made by statute.307  Similarly, the 
creation of post-grant administrative procedures at the USPTO is not 
something that the Federal Circuit could have created without 
congressional action.308 
Why is Congress’s dialogue with the judicial branch unique when it 
comes to patent law?  The answer lies largely with the Federal 
Circuit’s uniqueness among the Federal judiciary.  Congress created 
the Federal Circuit with an eye towards enlisting the court in some 
policymaking functions.309  It is not surprising therefore, that 
Congress views the court as an institutional policymaker, despite the 
court’s reluctance to overtly assume that role for itself.  Nor is it 
surprising that Congress is comfortable playing an initial catalytic role 
in policymaking.  In fact, allowing the Federal Circuit to shape 
doctrinal patent reform can free Congress to focus on administrative, 
procedural, or other types of reform measures.310  For example, 
during the AIA’s legislative process, the Federal Circuit’s doctrinal 
changes to thorny issues such as damages allowed Congress to pass 
                                                          
 304. See supra Part II. 
 305. See, e.g., supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing how the Patent 
Reform Act of 2006 was intended to create a dialogue between Congress and the 
courts to address the high reversal rate for claim constructions). 
 306. See Burk, supra note 25, at 23–24 (recounting the “political economy” in 
which the AIA was passed and that the day before the AIA became law, “a record 
number of patent lawsuits naming multiple parties were filed”). 
 307. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (indicating that the first-to-file 
system is similar to that of almost every other country). 
 308. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing how these procedures 
are intended to increase administrative oversight). 
 309. See Rai, supra note 15, at 1041 (arguing that it would be more economical for 
“greater fact-finding and policy application . . . [to be] vested at the administrative 
and trial court levels”); see also supra Part I.A. 
 310. See Burk, supra note 25, at 21 (outlining the impracticality of continuous 
legislative attention to patent reform). 
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reform measures that substantially altered the administrative 
proceedings of the patent system.311 
Furthermore, Congress is more likely to play a catalytic role in 
patent reform because the Federal Circuit is particularly cognizant of 
legislative proposals on patent law.312  Unlike the work of generalist 
courts, the work of the Federal Circuit is significantly impacted by 
legislative changes in a single area of law.313  Judges on generalist 
appellate courts will only rarely be impacted by any particular 
legislative change, and are therefore only mildly affected by any 
particular piece of legislation.  However, over one-third of every 
Federal Circuit judge’s caseload is made up of patent cases,314 and 
those cases tend to take up an outsized portion of the judges’ time 
and attention.315  It is thus predictable that the Federal Circuit 
monitors the legislative machinations on patent reform.  The court 
likely will continue to monitor future developments with equal 
interest and respond to suggestions made by Congress. 
B. The Federal Circuit as Reactor 
As demonstrated in Part II, the Federal Circuit reacted to legislative 
reform proposals in various ways.  Viewing the Federal Circuit’s 
responses in isolation helps elucidate how the court reacts to 
congressional reform signals. 
1. Direct advocacy 
The court’s first foray into patent reform came in the form of 
direct advocacy.  During the 110th Congress, the court’s Chief Judge 
sent letters directly to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, 
arguing against particular elements in legislation pending before 
those Committees.316  He also gave speeches to practicing attorneys in 
which he suggested that the changes to damages and claim 
construction in the proposed bills would adversely impact the work of 
                                                          
 311. See supra Part II.B (listing the back-and-forth between Congress and the 
Federal Circuit from 2006 to the AIA’s enactment in 2011). 
 312. See, e.g., Letter from Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, to Senators Patrick 
Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 192 (questioning the need for certain 
proposed legislation). 
 313. See, e.g., id. (assessing how the pending legislation could delay patent 
proceedings in several ways). 
 314. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  Appeals Filed, by Category (FY 
2013), U.S. COURT APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories 
/Statistics/fy%2013%20filings%20by%20category.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2014). 
 315. See id. (demonstrating that even though the court’s jurisdiction includes a 
multitude of subject matter areas, 34% of appeals that reach the court involve 
patent cases). 
 316. See supra notes 192–202 and accompanying text. 
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the courts.317  Further, he wrote various op-eds suggesting that 
Congress need not interfere in areas of patent litigation.318  Such 
direct lobbying of Congress from a sitting judge is rare.319  The 
directness with which Chief Judge Michel addressed congressional 
proposals suggests a court that views itself as uniquely situated to 
supervise the state of patent law.  Indeed, Michel’s predecessor, Chief 
Judge Rader, has continued the practice of directly addressing 
Congress by, among other things, writing op-eds expressing the lack 
of need for congressional action in the area of patent fee shifting.320 
It is difficult, however, to discern how much of the lobbying effort 
that occurred during the patent reform process reflects the views of 
the Federal Circuit judges as a unit and how much of the effort 
simply reflected the views of the Chief Judge.  Judge Michel never 
suggested that all of the judges on the court were of one mind about 
patent reform.  It might be the case that Judge Michel’s interest in 
patent reform was purely personal.  Judge Michel is, after all, former 
Chief Counsel for Senator Specter, one of the principle players 
behind the AIA.321  Thus, he is undoubtedly well-versed in the 
legislative process.  Indeed, he left the court before his term as Chief 
Judge had ended in order to “speak freely on all aspects of patent 
reform.”322  Since retiring, Judge Michel has said that as a judge he 
                                                          
 317. See supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text (highlighting the inefficiency 
of interlocutory review). 
 318. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel & Henry R. Nothhaft, Inventing Our Way Out of 
Joblessness, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2010) (advocating for more Federal Circuit funding so 
that the court can keep up with its caseload); see also Kristina Peterson, Q&A:  Judge 
Michel on Patent Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2009, 12:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/wash 
wire/2009/11/27/qa-judge-michel-on-patent-law (reporting on an interview with 
Judge Michel in which he argued that managing ongoing litigation and determining the 
proper method and amount of damages awards are “inherently judicial” in nature). 
 319. Cf. Michael J. Frank, Judge Not, Lest Yee Be Judged Unworthy of a Pay Raise:  An 
Examination of the Federal Judicial Salary “Crisis,” 87 MARQ. L. REV. 55, 55 (2003) 
(noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and other federal judges “urged Congress to 
raise judicial salaries”). 
 320. Randall R. Rader, et. al, Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html 
(arguing that congressional proposals on fee shifting in patent cases are unnecessary 
because judges “already have the authority to curtail” trolls by making them “pay for 
abusive litigation”). 
 321. Chief Judge Michel served as Senator Specter’s counsel and administrative 
assistant from 1981 until his appointment to the bench in 1991.  Biographical Directory 
of Federal Judges, supra note 282. 
 322. Crossing the Finish Line on Patent Reform:  What Can and Should Be Done:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 35 (2011) (statement of J. Paul R. Michel, former C.J., U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files 
/hearings/printers/112th/112-8_64407.PDF. 
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felt forced to limit advocacy to “the potential impact of proposed 
legislation on judicial administration and court operations.”323 
However, as the Chief Judge of the court, letters and comments 
from Judge Michel tend to be viewed as representing the entire 
court.324  Furthermore, the court set up an “advisory group” that 
monitored patent reform and advised the court on impending 
legislative changes.325  The precise role of this committee is unclear, 
but its existence suggests that the interest in patent reform extended 
beyond the Chief Judge’s chambers.  In addition to setting up the 
advisory group, the Chief Judge repeatedly urged IP litigators and 
patent holders to lobby Congress to remove the damages and claim 
construction portions of the bill.326  These actions impact the court as 
a whole and are unlikely to be sustained without at least tacit approval 
by the court. 
2. The court’s supervisory role 
Beyond direct advocacy, the court also engaged with patent reform 
legislation by exercising its role as a supervisor of lower courts, 
agencies, and even the specialized bar that practices before the court.  
During the debate surrounding damages reform, the court instructed 
district courts about the proper means of damage calculations and 
the requisite proof to support damages awards.327  The court 
performed this function through its written opinions, its directives 
and instructions to practitioners, and by sitting by designation in 
district courts.328 
The Federal Circuit has not limited its teachings to district court 
judges.  The court also instructed litigants about the types of cases 
                                                          
 323. Id. 
 324. Cf. Gene Quinn, An on the Record Interview with CAFC Judge Randall Rader, 
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 12, 2010, 4:09 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/04/12/an 
-on-the-record-interview-with-cafc-judge-randall-rader/id=10115 (explaining that a 
Chief Judge “is often asked to speak for the Court and makes an effort to properly 
reflect the Court’s viewpoints on things”). 
 325. See Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, 
Address to the Association of Corporate Patent Counsel (Jan. 28, 2008) (transcript 
available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/address_by_chief 
_judge_michel.pdf (discussing the advisory group that “is advising on changes in the 
patent law and, particularly, given the current circumstances, the pending legislation 
in the Congress”). 
 326. See id. (urging attendees “to assure that whatever the Congress [does] . . . 
reflects the best input . . . from all of the best minds” after repeatedly critiquing the 
damages and interlocutory review provisions of draft legislation and suggesting that 
Congress is overburdened with other issues). 
 327. See supra notes 256–78 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra notes 256–78 and accompanying text. 
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and arguments that would be especially appealing to the court.329  To 
the degree that the court is successful in encouraging litigants to bring 
particular cases and issues before it, the court increases its ability to 
make precedential decisions in cases that touch on present legislative 
debates.  This provides the Federal Circuit with more opportunities to 
shape patent policy.  Moreover, in doing so, the court may be 
attempting to convince Congress that courts are capable of improving 
the patent system and that legislative reform is unnecessary.330 
3. Judicial review 
Judicial review is the greatest tool that the Federal Circuit can wield 
to influence Congress.  The court can exercise this tool both in its 
non-discretionary review of controversies as well as by exercising its 
discretionary powers.  The court employed both powers in shaping 
the AIA. 
a. Non-discretionary review 
 In the debate over damage reform, the Federal Circuit had its most 
significant impact by deciding the patent cases that it hears on a 
monthly basis.  In 2009, at the height of congressional debate about 
the shape of patent damage reform, a three-judge panel heard Lucent 
Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.331  The opinion was greatly 
anticipated by the bar and by members of the Senate.  Senator 
Specter urged his colleagues to delay debate on the bill until after 
oral argument in the case.332  The opinion in the case reads like a 
plea to Congress to leave damage jurisprudence to the courts.  Lucent 
dealt with the two issues percolating in Congress at the time:  the 
method of calculating royalties and the appropriateness of the entire 
market value rule.333  In doing so, the court largely put in place the 
damages scheme envisioned by Congress.334  The court continued to 
address damages jurisprudence throughout 2009 and into 2011, 
                                                          
 329. See supra notes 217–19 (describing Chief Judge Michel’s speech, in which he 
encouraged patent litigators to raise legal challenges in en banc petitions). 
 330. See supra note 243 (highlighting one example of patent litigators noting that 
the court was able to correct patent damage awards without legislative intervention). 
 331. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 332. Letter from Senator Arlen Specter to Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick 
Leahy, supra note 229. 
 333. See supra notes 257–60. 
 334. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324–39 (discussing the appropriate calculation 
of damages). 
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clarifying the law in a way that had not occurred in the previous 
twenty-seven years of the court’s existence.335 
 The court’s shift towards a more aggressive supervisory role in 
damages jurisprudence evinces a court newly energized in an area of law 
that had been largely untended prior to Congress’s reform proposals.  
The Federal Circuit’s sudden interest in clarifying its damages 
jurisprudence is almost certainly a direct result of the proposed changes 
then circulating on Capitol Hill.  The emerging case law from the court 
has largely been viewed as a step in the right direction.336 
b. Discretionary review 
Consistent with its vision of itself as the expert body on patent 
litigation, the Federal Circuit viewed proposed changes to the patent 
venue provision with skepticism.337  However, the court did not 
publically discuss its views with Congress.  Instead, the court began 
granting writs of mandamus to review denials of motions to 
transfer.338  In doing so, the court significantly altered the manner in 
which district courts handle transfer motions in patent cases.339  The 
Federal Circuit’s newfound interest in venue decisions signaled to 
district courts that the Federal Circuit was scrutinizing transfer 
motions much more closely than in the past. 
The court has also begun, somewhat haltingly, to expand its use of 
en banc review.  During the patent reform period, Judge Michel 
urged litigants to make better use of the en banc process to bring 
troubling case law before the entire court rather than the Supreme 
Court or Congress.340  After the passage of the AIA, the court used its 
en banc power to resolve an issue that meandered in and out of the 
patent reform proposals.341  In 2010, the court announced that it had 
                                                          
 335. See supra notes 261–76 (summarizing the cases in which the court increased 
its scrutiny of damages awards); see also Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 76, at 
12 (noting that the Federal Circuit, in the 1980s “tended to hide behind the skirts of 
the district courts” on damages). 
 336. See, e.g., Zeng, supra note 257, at 366 (concluding that the court’s decisions 
improved the way damages were calculated and increased accuracy). 
 337. See, e.g., Michel, Address to the Association of Corporate Patent Counsel, 
supra note 325 (refusing to discuss venue because he had had too much to say on 
the topic). 
 338. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text (discussing the first time in its 
history the court used a writ of mandamus to overturn a transfer of venue decision). 
 339. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing factors to which 
the district court in TS Tech had given too much weight in denying the motion 
to transfer). 
 340. See supra notes 217–19 (describing Chief Judge Michel’s speech encouraging 
patent litigators to use en banc petitions to raise legal challenges). 
 341. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291–95 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (establishing the standard for proving inequitable conduct). 
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granted en banc review of a case concerning the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct, a troubled doctrinal area that had been 
languishing in uncertainty for over a decade.342  While the case was 
decided after the AIA was passed, the announcement that the Federal 
Circuit was hearing the case en banc likely led to the issue being 
dropped from the final legislation.343 
C. Separation of Powers Concerns 
The Federal Circuit’s interest in and engagement with patent 
reform indicates that the court has begun to exert itself as a 
policymaker.  The court has long seen itself as the expert body 
concerning patent law in its relationship with the USPTO, district 
courts, and the Supreme Court.  Establishing a dialogic relationship 
with Congress suggests the court views its role as complimentary to 
the legislative branch. 
The court’s engagement with Congress, however, does have 
potential downsides.  As an initial matter, objections may be raised as 
to the propriety of the Federal Circuit’s participation in the legislative 
process.  Traditionally, the judicial and legislative roles have been 
quite distinct.344  The distinctive nature of legislating and interpreting 
legislation is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, which separates the 
two functions and grants them to the legislative and judicial 
branches, respectively.345  It is well-established that Congress cannot 
interpret its own laws.346  The policy behind such a denial is clear:  
permitting Congress to interpret its own laws would reduce any 
incentive to create limiting and transparent rules.347 
                                                          
 342. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (per curiam); see Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285 (granting petition for 
rehearing en banc in recognition of “the problems created by the expansion and 
overuse of the inequitable conduct doctrine”). 
 343. Cf. John M. Golden, Patent Law’s Falstaff:  Inequitable Conduct, the Federal 
Circuit, and Therasense, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS, 353, 377–78 (2012) (describing 
provisions of the AIA that appear to endorse the court’s approach in Therasense). 
 344. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 963 (2012) 
(“[T]he Constitution denies Congress the authority to interpret its own laws.”); 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares:  On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 
83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1998) (“Traditionally, most academics and judges have 
viewed the legislative role as quite distinct from the judicial role . . . .”). 
 345. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I (vesting legislative powers in Congress), with id. art. 
III (vesting judicial powers with the Supreme Court and “in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”). 
 346. See Frost, supra note 344, at 963 (discussing how the Constitution’s creation of 
a separate judicial branch reflected a rejection of the English approach of having the 
upper legislative chamber serve as the highest court). 
 347. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 647–48 (1996) (“[W]hen a 
lawmaker controls the interpretation of its own laws, an important incentive for 
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While the separation of powers between courts and Congress is 
well-established, there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids a 
judicial response to pending legislation.  Indeed, scholars have noted 
that the Supreme Court and Congress have just such a dialogic 
relationship.348  The Court routinely signals to Congress that 
particular laws are in need of an overhaul.349 
Furthermore, courts have historically engaged in the legislative 
process in a wide range of areas.  For example, during William Taft’s 
tenure as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court actively lobbied Congress 
to increase the Court’s discretion over its caseload.350  The resulting 
Judiciary Act of 1925 gave the Supreme Court its certiorari power by 
which it can selectively grant review.351  Furthermore, Federal Courts 
casebooks are littered with examples of the Supreme Court using its 
judicial review power to define federal court jurisdiction, despite 
jurisdiction definition unquestionably being a congressional power.352  
As one scholar puts it, “the federal jurisdiction decisions suggest that 
the Supreme Court plays a role in defining federal jurisdiction at 
least as great as, if not greater than, that played by Congress.”353  
Other examples of direct judicial interaction in the legislative process 
include judges testifying before Congress regarding proposed 
legislation,354 staying cases pending legislative changes,355 and 
organized lobbying by judges in an effort to increase judicial pay.356 
                                                          
adopting transparent and self-limiting rules is lost because any discretion created by 
an imprecise, vague, or ambiguous law inures to the very entity that created it.”). 
 348. See supra note 34 (highlighting examples of the scholarship related to 
this dialogue). 
 349. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 344, at 22–23 (highlighting, as an example, 
San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which, in addition to 
ruling on the merits, the majority opinion and Justice Stewart’s concurrence 
discussed a need for reform of the property tax system). 
 350. Jeremy Buchman, Judicial Lobbying and the Politics of Judicial Structure:  An 
Examination of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 1 (2003). 
 351. Id. 
 352. See generally Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue:  The Supreme Court, Congress 
and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that the boundaries of 
federal court jurisdiction are not simply set by Congress but are the result of 
interaction between Congress and the courts). 
 353. Id. at 2. 
 354. See Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 20–21 (1999) (statement of Procter Hug, Jr., C.J., Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals) (opposing the House Judiciary Committee’s proposal to 
split the Ninth Circuit into divisions). 
 355. See, e.g., Action Wholesale Liquors v. Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Laws 
Enforcement Comm’n, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1306–07 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (staying 
judgment to give “the Oklahoma Legislature an opportunity to act” on the 
appropriate remedy for the violation at issue); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen, 407 
F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (staying judgment to allow the legislature 
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The Federal Circuit’s actions of teaching and judicial review 
leading up to the AIA are unlikely to violate established notions of 
separation of powers.  The court’s lobbying efforts, on the other 
hand, are more troubling from a constitutional perspective.  
Lobbying on judicial pay and jurisdictional issues is one thing—
lobbying about the substance of the law over which a judge is likely to 
rule is something wholly distinct. 
Aside from questions of constitutionality, scholars have questioned 
whether dialogue between Congress and a specialized appellate court 
is preferable to dialogue between various appellate courts.357  But 
whether intra-judicial dialogue would be beneficial is a separate 
question from whether congressional dialogue in patent law is 
valuable.  It would seem that congressional input is particularly 
desirable in patent law, with or without intra-court dialogue.  Because 
patent law deals with rapid technological innovation, legislators who 
represent the interests of innovators are often better positioned and 
able to more quickly identify problems than are appellate judges. 
D. Constitutional Competencies:  Leveraging Expertise 
To answer the normative question of whether the court’s new 
dialogic interaction with Congress is likely to benefit patent policy 
going forward, the respective competencies of Congress and the 
Federal Circuit in crafting patent policy must be examined.  A 
tremendous amount of political capital is required to pass any new 
legislation.  It is simply impractical to expect Congress to expend that 
capital every year in order to update the patent statute.  Continual 
congressional oversight in other areas of intellectual property has 
resulted in statutes bloated with special-interest provisions.358  As Dan 
Burk has noted, “The manifest impracticality of continuous legislative 
attention leaves courts and administrative agencies as the likely 
institutional stewards of statutory tailoring.”359 
                                                          
“sufficient time to act” and decide which of two alternative remedies “represent[ed] 
better public policy”). 
 356. See Frank, supra note 319, at 55 (explaining that while judges frequently 
disagree on legal issues, they are often brought together over the issue of increases in 
judicial salary). 
 357. See, e.g., Nard & Duffy, supra note 11, at 1623–25, 1664–67 (advocating for 
increased doctrinal percolation in patent law via competition among circuit courts). 
 358. Consider the Copyright Act, which is now approximately two hundred pages 
long and has numerous carve-outs for special interest groups.  For an overview of the 
Act’s shortcomings and new ways forward, see Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary 
Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551 (2007). 
 359. Burk, supra note 25, at 21. 
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Furthermore, the ex-ante nature of legislative—and to some extent 
administrative—action can be detrimental in an area of the law 
concerned with technological advance.  Mark Lemley and Dan Burk, 
for example, have argued that because of the patent statute’s broad 
provisions and the specific needs of various technological sectors, the 
courts are best positioned to respond, ex-post, to technological 
changes that challenge the patent laws.360 
Building off of Lemley and Burk’s insights, conceptualizing 
Congress as a catalytic partner with the court can improve the 
functioning of the court as it goes about the business of tailoring the 
statute to individual technologies.  Because the Federal Circuit 
handles a high volume of patent cases, it is at risk of suffering from 
tunnel vision.361  The court has been accused of elevating patent law 
above other innovation policy devices, such as trade secret law, 
governmental prizes for innovation, or unfettered competition.362  
Congress is well-positioned to judge when the court has fallen into 
the tunnel-vision trap.  When Congress feels that the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence has become a hindrance rather than a help to 
innovation, Congress can propose legislation and expect a response 
from the court.  Thus, the proposed legislation becomes a sort of 
default—it is passed only if the court is unable or unwilling to reform 
the law itself. 
The use of legislation as a spur to judicial action initially may seem 
as undermining the counter-majoritarian structure of Congress.  If 
Congress can reform the law by merely proposing legislation, then 
individual Congressman or small groups of legislators can change the 
law even if they lack the votes to pass statutes.  This counter-majority 
concern, however, is tempered by the reality that the Federal Circuit, 
while cognizant of legislative proposals, is likely to be moved to action 
only by legislative proposals that have a high probability of 
enactment.  Using the AIA as an example, the Federal Circuit 
responded to the legislative proposals only when it appeared that 
there was political momentum for reform. 
                                                          
 360. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 105, at 1674–75 (describing the judicial 
discretion in the patent system and the need for the court to use that discretion 
tailored to different industries). 
 361. See generally BAUM, supra note 26, at 16 tbl.1.3 (classifying the Federal Circuit 
as having a high concentration of cases). 
 362. See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 8, at 1860 (explaining that the court more 
frequently gives administrative-law deference in areas other than patent law); see also 
J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 921 (2011) (arguing 
that trade secrecy is, at times, socially preferable to patenting). 
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The give and take between the court and Congress has potentially 
salutary effects for the litigation of patent cases at U.S. district courts.  
During the patent reform era, the Federal Circuit consciously sought 
to empower district court judges making damages determinations.  
The court did this by crafting case law that clearly laid out the 
requirements for upholding damages decisions.363  Judges on the 
court also sat by designation in order to instruct the lower courts on 
proper handling of such cases.364  Improved instruction for district 
judges is a desirable goal since federal district courts are the main 
battlefield for patent litigants. 
For congressional dialogue with the Federal Circuit to improve the 
patent system, however, it requires continual oversight from Congress.  
While patent reform has been a staple of congressional debates over 
the past ten years, Congress was largely been silent on patent issues 
before that time.  If Congress were to revert to its prior disinterested 
state, the Federal Circuit would be once again left largely to itself with 
regards to patent policy.  While congressional disinterest might be 
preferable to some, the potential salutary effects of Congress’s 
moderating presence described in this Article would be lost. 
Lastly, congressional dialogue regarding patent law must also 
include the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court has recently 
become more active in the field, and has attempted to provide a 
check on the Federal Circuit’s control.365  It may be necessary at 
times, however, for Congress to assist in that endeavor.  Whereas 
the Supreme Court is limited to reviewing particular decisions of 
the Federal Circuit, Congress can engage in wholesale reevaluation 
of the patent system.366  The piecemeal nature of Supreme Court 
supervision and the volume of cases that the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 363. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the court’s judicial review power as a tool to 
influence Congress). 
 364. See supra notes 233–44 (demonstrating instances when Chief Judge Rader’s 
sitting by designation on different district courts instructed lower courts on the 
proper method to calculate patent damages). 
 365. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1305 (2012) (reversing the Federal Circuit’s finding of patentability for a diagnostic 
method patent, thereby reducing the scope of patentable subject matter); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226, 3231 (2010) (affirming the Federal Circuit but 
disavowing the “machine-or-transformation test” as overly formalistic); KSR Int’l Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “rigid 
approach” to obviousness determinations). 
 366. See Thomas, supra note 20, at 218 (“Congress is also better able to address 
patent law reform holistically, rather than in a piecemeal fashion by raising questions 
in rehearing orders.”). 
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reviews permit the Federal Circuit to diminish the impact of 
Supreme Court precedents.367 
Congress, on the other hand, is not limited to reviewing particular 
cases or rulings.  As demonstrated in the legislative debates over the 
AIA, Congress has the ability to completely alter the statutory 
foundations of patent law.  Congress can also mandate procedural 
changes for patent litigation—an area in which the Supreme Court 
has as yet remained uninterested.368  Through its role as catalyst, 
Congress can leverage its legislative powers in ways that catalyze the 
Federal Circuit to reconsider whole areas of patent law.  If unsatisfied 
with the Federal Circuit’s response, Congress holds the ultimate 
veto—legislative change. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s active approach to shaping patent reform 
legislation has been controversial.  Some have questioned whether a 
court should interact with pending legislation in any manner.369  The 
recent passage of the America Invents Act, however, revealed 
intriguing developments in the relationship between Congress and 
the Federal Circuit.  First, the Federal Circuit embraced its role as 
patent policymaker, at least insofar as patent litigation is concerned.  
Faced with a Congress interested in fundamentally altering various 
provisions of the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit significantly updated 
two areas of its case law that were in dire need of reform:  damages 
and venue.  Policymaking from the Federal Circuit can, at times, be 
beneficial for the patent system.  Compared to Congress, the Federal 
Circuit can more quickly update patent policy and can, at times, craft 
better solutions due to its ability to create nuanced rules and avoid 
procedural holdups that can plague the legislative process.370 
                                                          
 367. For a more complete discussion of the Supreme Court-Congress-Federal 
Circuit dynamic, see J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014). 
 368. Although this may be changing.  The Supreme Court recently heard two 
cases on fee shifting in patent cases.  See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (involving a challenge to the Federal Circuit’s 
test for finding a case “exceptional”); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (involving a challenge to the Federal Circuit’s standard 
of review of fee awards). 
 369. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 20, at 217–18 (arguing that judicial 
intervention in legislative matters makes it more difficult for legislators to 
negotiate and compromise). 
 370. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  HOW 
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT 166–68 (2004) (showing that Congress’s attempts to adopt sound 
policies are often thwarted by parties interested in the keeping the status quo); 
Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 10, at 801 (arguing that Congress lacks 
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Second, Congress demonstrated an ability to act as a catalyst of 
judicial patent reform.  By proposing substantial changes to venue, 
damages, and claim construction, Congress forced the Federal 
Circuit to grapple with thorny legal issues that it had largely ignored 
for decades.  In doing so, Congress moved the court’s jurisprudence 
away from its calcified state. 
Congress’s catalytic power to push the Federal Circuit to update 
patent law has potential salutary benefits for the operation of the 
patent system at various levels.  First, Congress can exert its influence 
over the Federal Circuit, infusing the court with input from a 
representative body.  District courts can also benefit from the push 
and pull between Congress and the Federal Circuit.  During 
congressional debates about the AIA, Congress’s actions moved the 
Federal Circuit to provide better instruction to the district courts in 
the area of damages and venue.  The Federal Circuit instructed lower 
courts both through written opinions and through its judges sitting 
by designation in district courts. 
The new relationship between the Federal Circuit and Congress 
holds out promise for the future of patent policy.  A Federal Circuit 
that is actively engaged with policy choices and cognizant of the 
broader implications of its interpretive activities is more likely than a 
rigidly formalistic court to strike the appropriate balance between 
encouraging innovation and enabling competition.  Congress can 
ensure that the Federal Circuit properly balances stakeholder 
interests by spurring the court to action via legislative proposals.  But, 
the congressional-Federal Circuit relationship requires continued 
congressional oversight of the patent system, a task that Congress has 
only recently taken seriously. 
                                                          
expertise necessary to craft particularized solutions); Nard, supra note 20, at 55 
(arguing for the institutional advantage of the Federal Circuit over Congress as 
policymaker).  But see Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 504–05 (2007) (suggesting that congressional 
reforms’ obstacles are not intractable). 
